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rINTRODUCTION
The s i t u a t i o n  in  Kampuchea has  been an  i n t e r e s t i n g  i s s u e  in  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  The Kampuchean p e o p le  have been  b a t t e r e d  and 
exposed  t o  f o r e i g n  d o m in a tio n  f o r  t h e  p a s t  f i v e  hundred  y e a r s .  A f te r  
su ch  a lo n g  p e r io d ,  how ever, p e ace  i s  s t i l l  n o t  a t  h an d . M oreover, s in c e  
t h e  1970s t h e  c o u n tr y  h as  fa c e d  t h r e e  m ajor e v e n ts ? 1 US bom bings t h a t  
s t a r t e d  in  1970 and c u lm in a te d  in  1973; th e  inhumane e v a c u a t io n  o f  
tow ns and m ass e x e c u t io n s  u n d e r t h e  Pol Po t erg im e (1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 8 ); and th e  
war be tw een  t h e  SRV and th e  Kampuchean r e s i s t a n c e  g ro u p s  s in c e  1979.
On December 2 5 ,1978  w hat h a s  been  c a l l e d  th e  Kampuchean problem  
o r  th e  T h ird  In d o c h in a  War b ro k e  o u t  when th e  army o f  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  
R e p u b lic  o f  V ie tnam  (SRV) lau n ch ed  an  in v a s io n  in to  K am puchea,2 o u s t in g  
Pol P o t 's  Khmer Rouge reg im e and i n s t a l l i n g  a new Khmer g overnm en t. 
T h is  new Khmer governm ent was t h e  P e o p le 's  R ep u b lic  o f  Kampuchea (PRK) 
le d  by p ro -V ie tn a m e se  Khmer, Heng S a m rin ,3 backed up by V ie tnam ese  
a d v is o r s  and f o r c e s .
1 Cheung K a -h in g ,Kampuchea: H i s to r i c a l  and G lobal C o n te x t o f  
t h e  C o n f l i c t , (Hong Kong: P lough  P u b l i c a t i o n s ) ,  1981, p . i .
2 In  t h i s  s u b - t h e s i s ,  t h e  te rm  "Kampuchea" i s  u sed  in s te a d  o f  
"C am bodia".
3 Heng S am rin  had been  a member o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  co m m ittee  o f  
th e  Communist P a r ty  o f  Kampuchea f o r  i t s  E a s te rn  r e g io n  and p o l i t i c a l  
com m ission  and. commander o f  i t s  F o u r th  D iv is io n . He was c r e d i t e d  w ith  
le a d in g  a r e v o l t  a g a in s t  t h e  Pol P o t governm ent in  May 1978. See M ichael 
L e i f e r ,  "Kampuchea 1979: From Dry S easo n  To Dry S e a so n " , A sian  S u rv e y , 
v o l .2 0 ,  n o . l ,  J a n u a ry  1980, p .3 4 .
2While the dramatis personae in the Kampuchean conflict are 
many, involving both the regional and extra-regional powers, the focal 
concern of this sub-thesis is on ASEAN and, Thailand in particular*
For Vietnam, there was no Kampuchean problem in the sense that 
what happened in Kampuchea was no concern of other nations. Vietnam's 
intervention, as defined by Vietnam, was thus morally and legally 
justified as it was made to assist the Kampuchean people and was made 
at the request of the legitimate Heng Samrin government.
However, ASEAN has asserted that the Kampuchean problem arises 
from the invasion by Vietnam which forms the root cause of instability 
in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's invasion is considered illegal and a 
violation of Kampuchea's independent, sovereign and territorial 
integrity.
Why has the Kampuchean problem been of so much importance in 
the formation of Thai foreign policy since the early 1980s, seeing that 
the issue is depicted as the SRV-Kampuchean war? Has Thailand managed 
to be neutral in such a conflict? Did the Vietnamese invasion make it 
easier for the governments of Thailand to attract the support of their 
regional partners within ASEAN?
This sub-thesis attempts to find out the answers. It is divided 
into three chapters. The first chapter is an overview of Thailand's 
foreign policy since the Vietnamese invasion in Kampuchea in 1979, i.e. 
the policy of the Kriangsak and Prem governments.
As the ASEAN members have rallied their political friends and 
economic, partners around the world into a solid front in opposition to 
Vietnam's position in Kampuchea, the second chapter will discuss the 
attitudes of the ASEAN members to the issue; differences between 
Indonesian and Malaysian views on the one hand, and Singaporean and
3Thai views on the other. The Philippines, more remote from the war 
area, and preoccupied with internal economic and social problems, has 
demonstrated relative indifference to the Kampuchean situation, The 
chapter will also discuss Thai reactions to those different attiudes.
The last chapter attempts to discuss the prospects for a 
• *Kampuchean settlement, and Thai views of it.
4CHAPTER 1
THAILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM: AN OVERVIEW
Since 1975 when Vietnam was unified, some changes in Southeast 
Asia's political and strategic circumstances can be discerned. One 
culminated point is that the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 
December 1978 with the establishment of a pro-Vietnamese regime headed 
by Heng Samrin in January 1979. This action has upset the balance of 
power in the region by the defacto Vietnamese conquest of the 
previously independent state of Kampuchea.
The impact of the Kampuchean conflict on the region has been 
complicated as it has not been an exclusively inter-communist affair. 
It has obviously affected the policy directions of some external powers 
Bnd adjacent countries. In the first place, the conflict is one of the 
competing interests of China and the Soviet Union, both of whose 
governments committed resources and prestige to their clients, Khmer 
Rouge and Vietnam respectively. In the second place, neighbouring 
countries, and Thailand in particular, have had a special concern and 
interest in preventing Vietnam from becoming the dominant power in 
Indochina, with the capacity to expand beyond its border.
The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea has become a major consi­
deration in Thai foreign policy, as Thailand is strategically situated 
in the middle of mainland Southeast Asia, and also shares a long border 
with two Indochinese countries! Laos and Kampuchea. Moreover, it is 
only in recent times that Thailand has had to take the primary 
responsibility for dealing with such a threat. In the past. Thailand's 
foreign policy orientation had depended on the policy of foreign 
allies. From the Thai perspective, Kampuchea has been regarded 
primarily as a buffer state: its independent and sovereign existence 
would thus ward off foreign dominance. Thus when Vietnam invaded 
Kampuchea in 1978, the strategic environment of Thailand was under 
threat.
In the Thai view, the events in Kampuchea have had detrimental
5effects on the peace and security of Southeast Asia. Militarily, there 
are about 100,000 Vietnamese troops near the Thai-Kampuchean border, 
and accordingly to the Thai Foreign Minister ACM. Siddhi Savetsila, 
Vietnam has in effect pushed its border westward to impringe on 
Thailand.1 This advance has also involved incursions by Vietnamese 
troops at many points actually across the Thai border. Moreover, it 
has resulted in several military encounters between Thai and Vietnamese 
soldiers, and in the process it has also affected civilians. Although 
Thailand has adopted a policy of constraint on the spillover effect of 
the Kampuchean conflict, she is concerned with the possibility of armed 
conflict between Thailand and Vietnam. This is due to the fact that
Thailand allowed the Pol Pot forces to use Thai territory as their
sanctuary and to recruit their supporters from the Kampuchean refugee 
camps.
Politically, there has been a question of the legitimacy of 
the Heng Samrin regime, installed by the Vietnamese after the genocidal 
Pol Pot government had been driven away. This issue is, of course, not 
without complications relating to the policies of other major powers.
A major social problem is caused by the large number of people
who fled from the troubled land and sought refuge in camps along the
border with Thailand. Evidence also shows that the Kampuchean conflict 
has posed a threat to Thai security as can be seen from the massive 
influx of Kampucheans and the possibility of fighting between the
1 ACM. Siddhi Savetsila, MThailand's contribution to 
regional security" , Foreign Affairs Bulletin, September-October 1983, 
p.34. Siddhi also remarked that this was the first time in the history 
of Southeast Asia that Thailand had to face with the situation of 
having share more than two thousand kilometres of her bonder with 
Vietnam, which has the fourth largest army in the world.
6Vietnamese troops and the resistance force spilling over into Thailand1. 
This influx of Kampuchean refugees also displaced over 100,000 Thai 
villagers in the area.
Accordingly, when the situation in Indochina changed in the 
late 1970s, Thailand was faced with the necessity of adapting to a new 
situation. When General Kriangsak Chomanand became Prime Minister in 
October 1977, his policy reflected his catalytic role in bringing about 
good relations between Thailand and the states of Indochina.’
The Policy of General Kriangsak's Government
The government of General Kriangsak came to power on 12 
November, 1977 as a consequence of an internal military dispute. In 
contrast to the preceding government of Thanin Kraivichian who had
1 Kramol Tongdhamachart, "Thai Perspectives of the Conflict in 
Kampuchea”, in Graduate School Journal. Chulalongkorn University, 1982. 
p. 136.
3 Ibid.
’ See Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Spring of hope or winter of 
discontent”?, Far Eastern Economic Review (Cited hereafter as FEER), 10 
May 1984, p.32.
* After three years of experiment with civilian governments and 
also the ultra-hawkish Thanin Kraivichian government, the military took 
over in October 1977 through a bloodless coup d ’etat and launched the 
Kriangsak's military goverment. See Reijiro Toba, "ASEAN favors Reagan's 
hard-line foreign policy”. Asia Pacific Community» A Quarterly Review, 
Winter 1981, p.63.
7followed a violently ant i-comrruni st policy, Kriangsak's major goal was 
to improve relations with neighbouring communist states. In his 
foreign policy address of 1 December 1977, Kriangsak restated the 
aspirations of the then civilian Prime Minister, Kukrit Pramoj, and 
indeed of former Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman also, by affirming that 
his government would "pursue an independent foreign policy" and would 
"promote ties with ASEAN and Indochinese states".1 *
Invitations to visit Vientiane and Hanoi provided the former 
leader with opportunities for constructive diplomacy and, though 
Kriangsak*s trips were described as "fact-finding" and "goodwill" 
visits,3 there is little doubt that his objective was to renew his 
personal relationships with Lao Premier Kaysone Promvihane and, perhaps 
more significantly, with Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, in order to 
help break the impasse over Kampuchea.* The hallmark of his policy 
towards Indochina had been the agreement to exchange ambassadors between 
Thailand and Vietnam, reached under his government on Z December 1977. 
(Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Vietnam had actually been 
established on 6 August 1976 but such was the Thanin government's 
animosity to Vietnam that the exchange of ambassadors was delayed.) 
Asked about Vietnamese forays into Thai territory, Kriangsak minimised 
their significance*
"We may know where the border is, but others may 
stray across it because they do not know. In any event, 
it must be pointed out that the intruders are not 
necessarily Vietnamese soldiers, but could be soldiers 
loyal to any side. We must not make it sound as if we 
are an enemy of Vietnam." *
1 Thai Foreign Affairs Ministry, News Bulletin, Novembei—
December 1977, p.15.
3 Paribatra, op.cit.
3
* FBIS, 19 November 1979, p.Jl.
8Thus» in his Kampuchean policy, Kriangsak adopted a less alarmist view 
of Vietnam in accordance with his policy of accommodation with the 
states of Indochina.
The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, however, reversed this 
policy of entente. The invasion violated the strategic environment with 
which Kriangsak's government had come to terms after the apprehension 
caused by the collapse of the Saigon government in 1975 had passed. The 
Vietnamese action in Kampuchea pointed towards confrontation between 
Thailand and Vietnam, as it affected Thai security. Even though Vietnam 
did not disclose its strategic motives for the attack, some critical 
issues were raised.1 * First, since the Vietnamese seemed willing to use 
force in a direct and overt manner in order to overthrow a neighbouring 
independent government and thus affect the regional balance of power, a 
shift of power in favour of the Vietnamese seemed virtually certain to 
occur. Second, of direct concern to Thailand, Vietnam may also have 
intended to block a Thai-initiated refugee return programme to test the 
response of the Thai armed forces and perhaps to put pressure on the 
Thai government to change its policies towards Kampuchea to a stance 
more amenable to Vietnam's objectives.3
Since the invasion and consequent deterioration of relations 
between Thailand and Vietnam, Thai policy has been aimed at a 
combination of political, diplomatic, military and economic pressure to 
force Vietnam to withdraw from kampuchea. Although Vietnamese Premier 
Pham Van Dong sent a message to Kriangsak assuring him that Vietnam 
would do nothing to endanger Thailand, the Thai fears of a full-scale 
Vietnamese incursion were intensified along with the fighting inside
1 Michael Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order In South-east
Asia, Adelphi Papers, no.162, p.28.
3 Larry A. Niksch, "Thailand in 19801 Confrontation with 
Vietnam and the fall of Kriangsak", Asian Survey, February 1981, p.223.
9Kampuchea and the increasing flow of refugees.1 Kriangsak's objective 
was to ensure a total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. 
Only this, in his view, would restore the historic buffer between 
Thailand and Vietnam and allow the two countries to cooperate in their 
common interest to block the southern expansion of Chinese influence.2 3
In international terms, the policy of the Kriangsak government 
can be seen as aimed at promoting "equidistance" among the superpowers” 
His conduct of diplomacy can also be described as being "omni-direc­
tional" in attempting to strengthen Thailand's position. After the 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978, he made major 
efforts to strengthen Thai military capabilities. He visited Washington 
from 4-16 February 1979 to gain a reassurance of continued US support 
and military supplies. Kriangsak said that the new situation had made 
it necessary to ask "my friend Jimmy Carter" for new military credits, 
adding: "We need military hardware, spare parts and quick delivery".“* 
As a result, he obtained President Carter's undertaking that the US 
would consider action under the Manila Pact if Thailand's security were 
threatened."
1 Ibid.
a Richard Nations, "Flexible Diplomacy from Thailand's New 
Premier", FEER, 25 April, 1980, p.10.
3 "Bangkok Stands Up To Leonid", Asiaweek, 6 Aprill 1969, p.10.
"* Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Cambodian conflict in Southeast 
Asia's strategic considerations", Asiam Profile, April 1980, vol.8, no. 
2, p.183.
° Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced
Foreign policy", Asian Survey, vol.22, no.11, November 1982, p.1049
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With regard to the Soviet Union, Generak Kriangsak also visited 
Moscow in March 1979. He was the first Thai premier to visit the 
Soviet capital. During this visit, his skill in presenting Thai foreign 
policy as a flexible response to changing circumstances was fully 
demonstrated when he carefully explained to the Soviets why Thailand 
refused to recognize the Heng Samrin regime. He also tried to convince 
the Soviets that Thailand had not tilted towards China.1 2
Kriangsak's first intention was probably to signal to Moscow 
that its desire to be consulted over regional affairs would be linked 
to tangible efforts to control the Vietnamese. He reportedly advised 
Soviet leaders that Thai policy was one of "strict neutrality".3 Thai­
land continued to sell rice to the Soviet Union, even though much of 
the rice is probably destined for Vietnam. It made an agreement to sell 
rice to the Soviets in December 1979. Kriangsak defended implementing 
the agreement by declaring in February 1980 that MWe will decide 
ourselves as to whom we should sell our grain".3 In return, the Soviet 
leaders assured him that Vietnam had no plan to attack Thailand.
Kriangsak's second intention was probably to remind the 
Vietnamese that the Soviet Union's regional aims in seeking ASEAN agree­
ment to Moscow's collective security proposals conflicted with Hanoi’s 
efforts to consolidate its position in Indochina. But if Kriangsak had 
hoped to undermine the Vietnamese expectation of Soviet support, by 
seeking to exploit differences in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship, 
he was disappointed.
The next link in Kriangsak's diplomacy was his visit to China 
from 29 March to 4 April 1979, which brought about the so-called Thai- 
Chinese alignment. It was at this time that the Chinese leader, Deng
1 Asiaweek, op.cit.
2 FEER, 6 April,1979 quoted in Buszynski.
a Bangkok Post, 9 February 1980.
Xiaoping, was seeking regional allies against Vietnam. Deng also 
expressed support for ASEAN and the neutralization proposal. In return 
Kriangsak refrained from raising questions about Chinese support for 
Thai insurgency movements,1 * for it was evident that Bangkok could not 
isolate itself from the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, especially after 
Vietnam had sought Soviet backing in occupying Kampuchea. Thus Soviet 
assistance to Vietnam had the effect of pushing Thailand into a closer 
relationship with China, as Thailand perceived it to be the only power 
that could apply pressure on Vietnam for a withdrawal from Kampuchea.
Nevertheless, because there was a degree of uncertainty about 
China's commitment, and that of the US, so the Thai government was 
reluctant to be drawn into military conflict in Kampuchea. The 
government of Kriangsak accordingly pursued an ambivalent policy which 
may be described as "flawed neutrality".3 This means that, in a 
diplomatic sense, Thailand was not neutral. It continued to recognize 
the Democratic Kampuchea regime and, although no one in Bangkok was 
willing to say it, Thailand would have preferred for strategic reasons 
a savage but independent Kanpuchea under the Khmer Rouge to a more 
humane regime under Hanoi.3
The Policy of General Prem's Government
General Prem Tinsulanond came to power on 21 March, 1980 after 
an economic crisis toppled the Kriangsak government. Under Prem. Thai 
policy to Kampuchea continued to be founded upon the basic assumption
1 The Thais openly accepted the Chinese distinction between 
party-to-party relations in order to be assured of what Kriangsak 
called in his banquet speech of welcome a "constructive relationship"
between Thailand and China. See News Bulletin, March-Aprill 1978,p.2.
3 Leifer, op.clt., p.29.
3 Asia 1979 Yearbook, p.313.
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t h a t  a V i e t n a m e s e - c o n t r o l l e d  I n d o ch in a  posed  a fu n d am e n ta l  t h r e a t  t o  
T h a i l a n d ' s  s e c u r i t y .  He a l s o  d e v e lo p e d  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  l i n k i n g  Thai- 
p o l i c y  w i t h  Ch ina ,  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  n e u t r a l i t y  o n ly  in  name.
Under  Prem, however ,  T h a i l a n d ' s  o r i e n t a t i o n  to w a rd s  t h e  
Kampuchean p rob lem  s h i f t e d  from a p o l i c y  o f  d e t e n t e  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  
communist  I n d o ch in a  s t a t e s  a s  p r a c t i s e d  u n d e r  t h e  K r i a n g s a k  government  
t o  a s t r o n g l y  a n t i - V i e t n a m e s e  p o l i c y .  The Prem g o v e r n m e n t ' s  h a r d l i n e  
a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  communist s  in  Laos and Vietnam was r e f l e c t e d  when 
t h e  Prem government  promoted a d e f e n c e  b u i l d - u p  a g a i n s t  p o s s i b l e  V i e t ­
namese e x p a n s i o n  westward a c r o s s  t h e  Mekong c o r r i d o r .
The p o l i c y  o f  t h e  fo rm e r  K r i an g s a k  governm en t ,  t o  a c h i e v e  a 
r ap p ro c h e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t s ,  l o s t  a l l  meaning f o l l o w i n g  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  
s u p p o r t  f o r  Vietnam a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n c u r s i o n s  i n t o  T h a i l a n d  a t  Non 
Mark Moon on 23-24  Ju n e  19801 D e s p i t e  t h e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in  r e l a t i o n s ,  
t h e  T h a i s  t r i e d  t o  keep t h e  p o l i c y  o f  e q u i d i s t a n c e  be tw een  t h e  s u p e r ­
powers  and a v o id e d  any d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t  be tw een  T h a i l a n d  and t h e  USSR. 
The t h e n  Thai Deputy F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  Arun Panupong p o i n t e d  o u t  d u r i n g  
h i s -  v i s i t  t o  Moscow t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  T h a i s '  i n c r e a s i n g  c o n c e r n  a bou t  
t h e  S o v i e t  p r e s e n c e  in  t h e  r e g i o n ,  "Thai  p o l i c y  i s  t o  be f r i e n d l y  w i t h  
a l l  c o u n t r i e s .  . We have no p rob lem  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t s ,  a p a r t  f rom t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  s u p p o r t i n g  Vie tnam a l o n g  t h e  b o r d e r " . “
But i t  was p r e c i s e l y  t h i s  t h a t  j e o p a r d i s e d  Thai hopes  t h a t  t h e  
s o v i e t s  would p u t  p r e s s u r e  on Vie tnam. T h a i l a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  sough t
1 Moreover ,  T h a i l a n d ' s  r e l a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  Union d e t e r i o r a ­
t e d  when, d u r i n g  P r e m 's  v i s i t  t o  China  in  O c to b e r  1980, f o u r  S o v i e t
w a r s h i p s  ------ t h e  a n t i - s u b m a r i n e  c a r r i e r  Minsk,  two p a t r o l  v e s s e l s ,  and
an o c e a n o g r a p h i c  s u r v e y  s h i p ----- on 31 O c to b e r  v e n t u r e d  c l o s e  t o  S a t t a h i p
n a v a l  b a s e  w h i l e  r e m a i n i n g  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  w a t e r s .  See B u s z y n s k i ,  op.  
c i t . ,  p .  1048.
2 A sia  1982 Yearbook , p . 2 5 4 .
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closer association with China in an effort to compel Vietnamese with­
drawal and deter further aggression. The Prem government has actively 
attempted to coordinate policy with China in the belief that Chinese 
support would ultimately thwart Vietnam’s interests. The significance 
of Prem's China policy was apparent during his visit to China in 
October 1980, when he attempted to persuade Chinese leaders to consider 
the formation of a coalition of anti-Vietnamese groups in Kampuchea.1 2
The formation of the Kampuchean resistance coalition in June 
1982 was probably the most significant event in Thai diplomacy during 
the early years of General Prem's government. There has been, however, 
little subsequent evidence to indicate that it was anything more than a 
coalition in name. Nevertheless while the Thais had been at the 
forefront of efforts to bring together the Khmer Rouge and 
non-communist resistance leaders, Son Sann and Sihanouk, in a so-called 
alliance, there was also recognition of the inherent danger of being 
sucked into a conflict.3
Relations between Thailand and China obviously grew closer when 
the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang paid a return visit to Bangkok on 30 
January to 2 February 1981.3 His visit resulted in a convergence of 
Thai and Chinese policies over the issue of Kampuchea. The prospect .of 
unified resistance against the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea had 
been raised in discussion. The Chinese Premier assured the Thais that 
any Vietnamese attack on Thailand would immediately prompt a Chinese
1 See "Declaration on the formation of the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea" and other CGDK documents in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979- 
1985, (Bangkok, Thailand), 1985, pp.119-122.
2 Asia 1983 Yearbook
a Asia 1982 Yearbook, p.255.
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assault, on Vietnam's northern border. However, he added the condition 
that concrete action would depend upon "the development of the 
situation at that time",1 *3
However, the resentment of Prem's close relations with China
was expressed by a faction within the military knowni as the "Young
Turks", who had shown their prowess by bringing down Kriangsak's
government.“ The revo1utionary counci1, formed by coup leaders in
Bangkok during their attempted coup from 1-3 April 1981, issued a 
declaration on 2 April that promised to make "improvements" in Thai
3foreign policy in this respect. However, in crushing the rebellion, 
Prem, who had visible support of the Monarchy in Korat, removed the 
source of immediate internal resistance to cooperate with China. 
Contacts with China were thus perceptably increased in the aftermath of 
the attempted coup.
Thus, a polarization in the region, which was initiated by the 
Soviet intention to support Vietnam, was intensified by the close 
relations between Thailand and China. Thai policy in seeking closer 
coordination with China actually hardened the Vietnamese in their 
intransigence and deepened their dependence upon the Soviets. Hanoi 
continued to accuse Thailand of serving Chinese interests and acting as 
a conduit of Chinese supplies to the Khmer Rouge.
1 Ibid.
On the "Young Turks" faction in the Thai military, see David 
Morel 1 and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Political conflict in Thailand 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981), pp,279-280.
3 Bangkok Post, 3 April 1981.
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T h a i l a n d  c o n t i n u e d  t o  t a k e  co m fo r t  f rom i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  
t h e  US. Under t h e  Manila  P a c t ,  t h e  US has  serve 'd  a s  T h a i l a n d ' s  
t r a d i t i o n a l '  s u p p l i e r s  o f  arms and a s  u l t i m a t e  g u a r a n t o r  o f  i t s  
s e c u r i t y .  The US a l s o  r e a f f i r m e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  Thai  p o l i c y  and acknowled­
ged t h e  Kampuchean c o a l i t i o n  ag reem en t  a s  an i m p o r t a n t  deve lo pm en t  in  
a p p l y i n g  more p r e s s u r e  on t h e  V i e t n a m e s e . 1 23 Thai l e a d e r s ,  however ,  
r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  US i n t e r e s t s  were engaged  in  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  a s  a 
c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  S o v i e t  enc roachm en t  and t h a t  American p o l i c y  was 
d i r e c t e d  more by g l o b a l  s t r a t e g i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  such  a s  t h e  S o v i e t  
N a v y ' s  u s e  o f  Cam Ranh Bay, t h a n  by l o c a l  c o n c e r n s , "
Under  t h e  Prem governm ent ,  T h a i l a n d ' s  b a s i c  o b j e c t i v e  has  been  
t o  c o u n t e r  d i p l o m a t i c  moves by t h e  V ie tn am ese  and i t s  a l l i e s  t o  
t r a n s f o r m  t h e  Kampuchean i s s u e  i n t o  a d i s p u t e  be tw een  Bangkok and Hanoi 
and t o  e n c o u ra g e  wor ld  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  f a i t  a ccom pli  i n  Kampuchea. 
The Thai F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  S iddh i  S a v e t s i l a ,  has  r e p e a t e d l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  
T h a i l a n d  w i l l  o n l y  u s e  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  a g a i n s t  Vie tnam and w i l l  n o t
3
f a l l  i n t o  t h e  t r a p  o f  b e in g  d ragge d  i n t o  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  S id d h i  a l s o  
r e f u s e d  t o  a c c e p t  a h o t l i n e  measure  o r  even  a n o n - a g g r e s s i o n  p a c t ,  
which were p ropose d  by t h e  V ie tnam ese  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  Nguyen Co Thach, 
t o  p r e v e n t  c l a s h e s  between  Thai and Vie tnam ese  t r o o p s .  An a c c e p t a n c e  o f  
such p r o p o s a l s  would mean t h a t  T h a i l a n d  would a c c e p t  t h e  f a i t  accompli  
o f  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  Vie tnamese  t r o o p s  a l o n g  t h e  Thai b o r d e r .  T h a i l a n d ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  S i d d h i ,  i s  n o t  in v o lv e d  in  t h e  war waged by Kampuchean 
r e s i s t a n c e  f o r c e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  t h e  V ie tnam se  army.
1 B u s z y n s k i ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 1 0 4 7 .
2 I b i d . , p .1 0 4 8 .
3 Rodney T a s k e r ,  Avo id ing  V i e t n a m ' s  T r a p s ,  FEER, 19 A p r i l l
1984, P .16
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Since Hanoi imposed control by its armed forces over Kampuchea, - 
Thai policy has concentrated on neighbouring communist Indochina and 
this problem continued to be a prime concern for Thai security.
Basically, Thai attitudes towards the problem have remained 
unaltered. Thailand's main diplomatic efforts have been devoted to 
trying to persuade Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, and 
thus ease the communist threat on its border. The Thais held the 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea responsible for the existing conflicts 
in Kampuchea, as well as for instability in Southeast Asia in general.
Regarding the formation of the Coalition Government of Democra­
tic Kampuchea, Thailand generally appeared pleased at the way the 
coalition has been functioning politically, despite evidence of 
friction between Khmer Rouge guerrillas and armed elements loyal to the 
two non-communist partners.
Thailand has also been anxious to avoid direct involvement in 
the actual fighting. As far as the conflict within Kampuchea is 
concerned, the Thai government has declared itself neutral and shunned 
involvement. However, such neutrality is suspect, especially to Hanoi, 
as it became evident that the Pol Pot resistance has been able to make 
use of Thai territory along the common border as an active sanctuary 
and as a source of resupply. Indeed, there is reason to believe that 
the Chinese government has used Thai territory, including its waters, 
to sustain the forces opposed to the Heng Samrin regime with military 
assistance.1
1 In terms of military cooperation, China cemented a kind of in 
formal military alliance with Thailand shortly after Vietnam's invasion 
of Kampuchea and China's invasion of Vietnam, promising to once again 
invade Vietnam if Vietnamese troops enter Thailand. Beijing's military 
actions on the border, and its continued aid to anti-Vietnamese forces 
in Kampuchea have, to Thai leaders, given this promise a considerable 
degree of credibility. See John F. Copper, "China and Southeast Asia", 
in Donald E.Weatherbee (ed.),Southeast Asia DlvidediThe ASEAN-Indochina
Crisis, Westview Press, 1985, pp.47-64
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The tacit understanding between Thai and Chinese policy on 
Kampuchea that the Prem government fostered was an acknowledgment of 
the obvious fact that China is the only power that shares the immediate 
Thai concern that Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn from Kampuchea. 
Nevertheless pursuit of the classical balance of power is seen as 
essential - that is, a balance between China, ASEAN,the US and the USSR- 
as the experience of alliance with a single great power had taught 
Thailand the dangers of being discounted as a dependent ally.
However, concern has been expressed by some ASEAN officials, 
particularly those from Indonesia and Malaysia, that Thailand's rela­
tionship with China is now uncomfortably close.
In the process of forign policy formulation of small country 
like Thailand, one way to decrease a bad effect is to cooperate with 
neighbouring countries, the ASEAN members.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ATTITUDES OF ASEAN MEMBERS TO THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE
Some principal developments in the Asian region since the 1970s 
have affected the security of Southeast Asia: the Sino-Soviet conflict; 
the US. withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia; the close relations 
between Vietnam and the Soviet Union; and, of more direct importance to 
ASEAN, the presence of Vietnamese military troops in Kampuchea. These 
changes, especially the situation in Kampuchea, have brought new 
concerns to ASEAN members. The ASEAN countries, which initiated the 
concept of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), have 
expressed their concern that such an invasion, apart from violating the 
principle of non-intervention, has introduced an era of Great Power 
involvement in the region. Indeed, the anticipated danger from these 
Indochina developments was not so much the emergence of communist 
regimes per se, as the impact that these regimes would have upon the 
indigenous communists of ASEAN countries, on the one hand, and that 
these situations would affect the security of neighbouring countries of 
ASEAN, on the other. As it became clear that the growing rivalry 
between China-supported Kampuchea and Soviet-supported Vietnam was 
intensifying, ASEAN felt compelled to clarify its positions.
As ASEAN's main concern with regard to the Kampuchean problem 
was Vietnam's relationships with the Soviet Union and the ways in which 
the former dealt with Kampuchea, responses from ASEAN at Bn early stage 
were similar to its stated objectives; to preserve peace and to uphold 
the self-determination of the Kampuchean people. ASEAN's policy to 
Indochina states, particularly Vietnam, was then aimed at non-involvement 
and accommodation. This policy was evident at a special meeting of 
ASEAN's Foreign Ministers in January 1979 in Bangkok when the outcome 
was a joint statement indirectly censuring Vietnam and calling for a 
withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea. Significantly, Vietnam was
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named only in the preamble and not in the main clauses of the 
statement1, indicating that ASEAN wanted to present a strong statement 
but one still conciliatory enough to keep the lines open to Vietnam. 
This attitude was also reflected in the ASEAN objective of maintaining 
its neutral path without leaning towards China.
However, ASEAN members were worried about the implications of 
Vietnamese sponsorship of the Kampuchean National Front for National 
Salvation (KNFNS)2 as a cover for Vietnamese intervention. This posed a 
critical problem for relations between ASEAN and Vietnam. Consequently, 
ASEAN initiated the convening of an International Conference on 
Kampuchea (ICK), sponsored by the UN, in 1981 and took the position of 
giving support to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK); but this support was limited to diplomatic and political 
support only.
As ASEAN covers a range of diverse political and historical 
backgrounds, there are more differences than similarities among its 
members. Thus one problem for its unity is that the sense of shared 
predicament of the ASEAN states has never been expressed in terms of a' 
common identification of external threat. This lack of a tangible
1 See the Joint Statement, Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers on the Current Political Development in the South East Asian 
Region in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents on the Kampuchean 
Problem 1979-1985, (Bangkok, Thailand), 198b, p.74.
2 See Thakur Phanit, "ASEAN Cooperation and developments in 
Indochina" in Aspects of ASEAN, eds.by Werner Pfennig and Mark M.B.
Suh, 1984, p .132.
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common source of external common threat has led to a further problem of 
common response.1
Thus in this decade ASEAN has faced a difficult problem of how 
to maintain neutrality in the Kampuchean conflict, while backing Thai 
policy (against Vietnamese pressure) neither to support nor to 
repatriate refugees, and at the same time maintain national interests
of all ASEAN members.
/
ASEAN; Which is the greater threat, Vietnam or China?
As distance from -danger lessens the priority of concern, 
consensus among the ASEAN members cannot be reached about the relative 
threats posed by Vietnam and China. While all ASEAN governments have 
indicated concern about the potential hazards of a spreading conflict, 
national assessments of the situation differ greatly. For instance, to 
some countries which have had bitter experience with the PRC in the 
past, it appears that the PRC presents a more dangerous threat, possibly 
because of its size and its inclination to get involved in the internal 
affairs of other countries, especially in political and idealogical
1 One example of problems of the ASEAN members' common 
response was that the concept of neutralization of the region. While 
the Malaysian government conceived of neutralization as serving
primarily a domestic political purpose, Indonesia viewed the proposal 
with suspicion because of the role allocated to external powers; 
especially to China. For Singapore, it favoured a balanced multiple 
involvement of extra-regional powers. See Michael Leifer, "ASEAN and the 
problem of common response", Internationa1 Journa1, vol.38 (1982-1983), 
p.320.
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matters. On the other hand, some ASEAN countries view Vietnam as the 
long-term threat basically because of Vietnamese historical 
expansionism.
Soon after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, ASEAN members 
began to discuss possible cooperation in the face of Vietnam's new 
challenge. Generally, each state rejected Vietnam's offer of bilateral 
non-aggression pacts and friendship treaties. They all agreed that no 
treaties or agreements would be initiated with Vietnam, as they feared 
that this would be the first step in drawing ASEAN into the conflict. 
Moreover, as a collective entity, ASEAN members have had three main 
concerns.1 * Firstly, they feared that the Thai-Vietnamese tension might 
develop into an armed conflict that would involve the other ASEAN 
states. Secondly, they were afraid that the domino theory might yet be 
proved right if insecurity in Thailand were to increase. Thirdly, they 
all viewed Vietnam's behaviour as violating the principle of 
non-intervention.
Broadly speaking, ASEAN's overall objectives in the Kampuchean 
problem are three-fold; it seeks to enhance Thailand's security against 
direct or indirect threats from Vietnam; it seeks to promote a balance 
of interests among the great powers; and it seeks to bring about more 
order in its relations with Vietnam.3 ASEAN's strategy towards
1 Astri Suhrke, "ASEAN: Adjusting to New Regional Alignments",
Asia Pacific Community: A Quarterly Review, no.12 (Spring 1981), p.20.
3 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Between Watana Nakorn and the UNGA: 
The Growing Delusion in ASEAN's Diplomatic Towards The Kampuchean 
Conf1ict, a paper presented to the Second Meeting of ASEAN Institutes 
of Strategic and International Studies on "Regional Development and 
Security: The Ties That Bind". (Kuala Lumpur), 12-16 January, 1986, pp.
5-6.
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Kampuchea has also remained unchanged since 1980. It relies mainly on 
political, diplomatic and economic measures to isolate Vietnam. At the 
same time, it hopes that military pressure by the resistance within 
Kampuchea backed by external support (chiefly from China) will compel 
and deter Vietnam without ASEAN's being directly involved.
However, beneath the superficial cohesion of ASEAN on the 
Kampuchean issue, the divergent security perceptions of individual 
member states have persisted. The common concerns of the members are 
more apparent than real and have only symbolic force within the 
regional association. Individually, each state has its own attitude to 
the developments in Indochina. Moreover, they have not maintained a 
fully unified diplomatic stance; the Kuantan proposal was an obvious 
example of the importance of their differences.1 Geopolitical and 
ethnic factors explain many of the variations in ASEAN's responses to 
the Kampuchean conflict.
There are a range of different responses to the challenge of 
Vietnam. Among the ASEAN members, Indonesians have a sense of 
nationalist affinity with Vietnam. The enduring perceptions of 
long-term Chinese threat by both Indonesian and Malaysian goverments 
have engendered a different response to the problem from that of other 
ASEAN members. Thus they have viewed the historical antagonism between 
Vietnam and China as a natural political obstacle to Chinese expansion 
in the Southeast Asian region. On the other hand, Thailand and 
Singapore regard the resurgence of Vietnamese communism and nationalism 
as posing the most immediate and serious threat to the region. Contrary 
to Indonesia and Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore see China as a source 
of countervai1ing power.
Herein lies the basis of the differences within ASEAN regarding 
the Kampuchean conflict: while Indonesia and Malaysia are sympathetic 
to the prospect of greater Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore seem to
See details of the Kuantan proposal later in this chapter.
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prefer a restriction on the influence of Vietnam and would like to see 
restored the buffer state of Kampuchea. Differences among them emanate 
from the fact that the Kampuchean conflict poses unequal threats to the 
ASEAN members. For Thailand, geopolitical reasons have made the Thais 
highly sensitive to land-based threats coming from both their western 
and eastern borders. On the other hand, Indonesia's geopolitical 
security from an immediate external threat provides the country with an 
opportunity to take a more multi-directional and long-term view of the 
world and the region.
These two divergent conceptions of security interests have 
aggravated other conflicts of interest within ASEAN. Although these 
differences are not likely to erupt openly, it does not follow that 
such latent tensions may not become serious and have far-reaching 
implications. These tensions may lead to greater unilateralism within 
ASEAN. Although both sides are careful to conceal their differences, 
the division might become more open if either side strongly expresses 
and supports its viewpoints.
In the past, all ASEAN members have been worried about the 
PRC's support the communist insurgents in the region since the PRC was 
viewed as the source of communist subversive activities and thus was 
seen as a threat to the ASEAN governments.1 2 The comunist parties of 
Southeast Asia were more pro-Beijing than pro-Moscow. But Vietnam's 
invasion of Kampuchea in 1979 changed this view, as such an action was 
assumed to be backed by the Soviet Union. The ASEAN states were 
fearful of becoming dominoes. This alarmist view was reflected in the
1 See Tim Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina: A Study of Common 
Response, 1975-1981, The Australian National University, 1985, p.51.
2 G.W.Choudhury, "ASEAN and the Communist Countries", Asia
Pacific community: A Quarterly Review, Summer 1981, no.13, p.44
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emergency meeting of ASEAN which was held in Bangkok.1 As noted above, 
the ASEAN foreign ministers issued a strongly worded statement calling 
for the irimediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from 
Kampuchea.
For ASEAN, the Chinese connection, however, is the crux of its 
political problem and ASEAN members Bre afraid that any new Chinese 
attack on Vietnam might be rationalized as a contribution to Thailand's 
defence. Moreover, as Thailand has permittted the transportation of 
Chinese military assistance to the Khmer Rouge through Thai territory, 
it is feared that this might draw Thailand to the Chinese side in the 
Sino-Vietnamese conflict and hence undermine ASEAN neutrality.
Indonesia: Chronic fear of Chinese regional hegemony
By contrast, the Indonesian leaders, particularly those in the 
Defence Ministry, see Vietnamese dominance in Indochina as beneficial 
to regional security, creating a buffer for ASEAN states against 
Chinese pressure and acting as a "starting point for a regionally 
ordered structure of relations".2 The Vietnamese invasion, however, 
compelled Indonesia to assert loyalty to Thailand whose strategic 
environment had been threatened.
Indonesia's stance towards the PRC since 1970s has been marked 
by several characteristies. Firstly, and basically, the Suharto govern­
ment's view of a Chinese threat is partly created by the presence in 
Indonesia of an economically important Chinese minority. The fear of 
China as a threat is not of recent origin but has been prevalent since 
1950 when tension between the two countries arose over the prohibition
1 See further details of the meeting in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, op.cit., p.74.
3 Hux1ey, op.cit.
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of ethnic Chinese participation in trade in rural areas in Indonesia.1 2
Tensions, however, were contained on both sides as they moved under
President Sukarno closer politically to one another. The present
Indonesian government is concerned about Chinese residents in the 
country because they have resisted assimilation into Indonesian society 
and culture, and also because they have traditionally dominated finance 
and commerce.“ Second, like most other Southeast Asian states, the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has been supported by the PRC, and by 
elements of the Chinese community within the country. The abortive 
coup in Indonesia in 19G5 was to be blamed a^ China was said to be 
implicated in it. Although the PKI has ceased to function as an active
political force, remnants of its leadership reside in exile in China
(or in the USSR) and it remains in principle in a state of armed 
uprising against the Indonesian government. The attempted coup in 1965 
thus caused the Indonesian government to suspend diplomatic relations ^ 
with the PRC on the suspicion that the PKI had PRC backing. Third, 
Indonesia has a relatively positive view of Vietnam on the grounds that 
Vietnam's militant struggle for independence reflects Indonesia’s own 
experience of armed struggle against colonialism.
However, there was an initiative by Indonesia to improve 
Sino-Indonesian relations. In January 1980 President Suharto signed 
two related decrees to facilitate the speedy naturalization of some 
95,000 Chinese nationals resident in Indonesia.3 At the same time, the 
PRC also indicated a willingness to resume diplomatic relations.
Nevertheless, suspicions of the Chinese threat still linger among 
Indonesian officials, and particularly among the military.
1 See more details in John H. Esterline and Mae H,Ester line, 
How the Domino Fell: Southeast Asia in Perspective, Hamilton Press, 
1986, p.311.
2 Ibid.
3 Asia 1980 Yearbook, p.188.
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In contrast to this continuing suspicion of the PRC, Indonesia 
has adopted an understanding stance towards Vietnam es an independent 
communist country which should be welcomed as a buffer between China 
and the Southest Asian region. The Commander of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces, General Benny Murdani, has remarked that Vietnam was not a 
threat to the region.1 * He even stated that the Indonesian people and 
armed forces shared the wishes of Vietnamese towards peace in the 
region.3 In a significant sense, this is a restatement of Indonesia's 
long-term position: Indonesia believes that a strong Vietnam could act 
as a barrier to the southward expansion of the Chinese. Previously, an 
Indonesian ambassador to Hanoi, Mr. Hardi, suggested at a seminar in 
Jakarta that China might succeed if Thailand regarded the threat 
from Vietnam as being greater than that from China.3 The Foreign 
Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, also argued that China wanted to make 
use of ASEAN to implement its own policies.
It would not be right for Thailand to blame Indonesia for 
viewing China as a threat to both national and regional security. 
Indonesia has understandably been alarmed into thinking that the 
long-term threat to the region comes from China and this fear has been 
reinforced by the fact that the PRC has never abandoned its 
party-to-party relations with the local insurgents. Although the PRC 
has stated that it has no designs on Southeast Asia, there is no 
guarantee that this attitude will be maintained in practice.
Malaysia: the Chinese threat
The importance Malaysia attaches to the security of the region
1 "The Politics of Kampuchea: ASEAN's Catch 22", ASEAN
Forecast, vol.4, no.3 March 1984, p.37.
3 S.Thana, "The Kampuchea Crisis: Flurry of talks, only a 
glimmer of hope", Asian Defence Journal, May 1984, p.59.
3 Suhrke, op.cit., p.23.
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is clear. Indeed, a major unilateral initiative partly in response to 
the developments in Indochina, was undertaken by the government of 
Malaysia. At the ASEAN meeting in 1971 it proposed the ideal concept 
of the so-called "ZOPFAN"; the neutralization of Southeast Asia to be 
realized through the collective guarantee of the major powers. 
Moreover, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, 
listed Malaysia's commitment to ASEAN as the first priority of its 
foreign policy, followed by its commitment to the Muslim countries, the 
non-a1ignment movement, and then the Commonwealth countries.1
However, Malaysia is less ready than some other ASEAN members 
to treat the Vietnamese as a threat to regional stability. Like 
Indonesia, the Malaysian posture has reflected a deep concern with the 
perceived threat from China.2 Its "ZOPFAN" initiative, realistic or 
otherwise, .presupposed guarantees by the great powers to respect the 
sovereignty of Southeast Asian states by not involving themselves 
either politically or militarily in the region. For Malaysia,
involvement by any external powers is regarded as unacceptable 
behaviour. Prime Minister Mahathir has stated that Malaysia does not 
differentiate between the role of China and that of the Soviet Union. 
According to him, both are equally disruptive; "We want to keep them at 
arms length."3 However, if Malaysia has to choose sides, it seems that
1 Lee Poh Ping, "The Indochinese Situation and the Big 
Powers in Southeast Asia: The Malaysian View" ,Asian Survey, vol.23, 
no.6, dune 1982, p.516.
2 The Kuantan principle symbolised Malaysia's fear that 
dependenceo*China to bleed Vietnam over the future of Kampuchea would 
destroy ASEAN's long-term hopes for a ZOPFAN and turn Southeast AsiB 
once more into a location of great powers rivalries. See Sheldon W. 
Simon, "The Two Southeast Asia and China: Security Perspectives", Asian 
Survey, vol.24, no.5, May 1984, p.527.
3 See more details in "Interview/Mahathir Mohamad", FEER 30
October-5 November,1981, pp.31-34.
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it would choose to support the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese 
positions rather than that of the PRC. Malaysian leaders see
Soviet-Vietnamese relations as an important axis because Vietnam needs 
Russian military assistance against China. Moreover, a senior Malaysian 
official was quite frank in admitting that:
"What we would prefer is a strong Vietnam -- one
which is a counterpoise to Chinese influence—  irre­
spective of whether it holds sway over Laos and Kam­
puchea. But what we don't want is a Vietnam so strong 
it will dominate Southeast Asia."1
Malaysia's apprehension of China's motives in the region has 
become more open since Dr. Mahathir assumed the premiership from Tun 
Hussein Onn and openly declared China to be a threat to Southeast Asia. 
The Malaysian perception of the Chinese threat has deep roots. Malaysia 
maintains that China has adopted a belligerent attitude towards 
Southeast Asia. The Malaysian government has a strong belief that its 
clandestine communist party has historically drawn most of its support 
from the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia. Moreover, the PRC permitted the 
clandestine groups to broadcast from Yunnan2. Although- China has 
signalled that it has discontinued military support to these parties, 
the Malaysian government still remains suspicious of Chinese 
involvement. Malaysia's attitude conflicts with that of the Thais on 
the point that Malaysia saw no reason to accept even moral links with 
China: Malaysia’s policy is always to press the Chinese to offer more 
positive reassurances to the ASEAN countries.
1 Richard Nations, 'Flexible Diplomacy from Thailand's new 
premier", FEER, 25 April,1980, p.ll.
2 The broadcasting station called the voice of the Malayan 
Revolutionary that beams messages hostile to the Malaysian government 
is particularly annoying to the Malaysians. The government has urged 
the PRC to refrain from such broadcasts if their declarations of 
friendship for Malaysia are true. See Lee Poh Ping, op.clt., p.519.
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Second, unlike Indonesia, Malaysia has a direct interest in the 
stability of Thailand. While the government has managed to contain its 
communist guerrillas, it has not been able to eliminate them entirely 
and the remnants have camped along the border between Thailand and 
Malaysia. It is assumed by the Malaysian government that so long as the 
guerrillas get continuing Chinese support, they will pursue their 
operations against the Malaysian government. Malaysia remains 
unconvinced that there is a distinction between state-to-state and 
party-to-party relations, for in China the party controls the
government.1
However, the Indonesian-Malays5 an position is perhaps best 
summed up by a senior ASEAN diplomat who stated:
"Vietnam's intransigence has given them no other 
choice (but to go along with the Thai position).
This is not an acceptance as such but more a 
realisation of Thailand's need (to depend on China) 
as present realities dictate. But as and when the 
Vietnamese become more flexible, they would expect 
the Sino-Thai relationship to loosen up, and Bangkok 
to be more accommodating with Hanoi"."
The Philippines: an indifferent view
The Philippines seems to be the only ASEAN member which has 
taken a low-key approach to the Kampuchean conflict. Far from the 
situation, preoccupied by internal problems and least affected by the 
conflict, one feature of the varying perspectives of ASEAN has been the 
Philippines' low profile. Generally, the Philippines has clearly 
stated in the international arena its support for the ASEAN position 
for the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) resolutions on the
1 Lee Poh Ping, op.cit.
Cited by Pi sal Sricharatchanya, "Staying just friends",
FEER, 11 December, 1986, p.34.
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Kampuchean problem. However, it seems that the Philippines is 
relatively indifferent on this issue. In his speeches and interviews 
on February 18, 1980, the former Philippines President Marcos outlined 
his views on the new strategic situation in the region and its 
implications for ASEAN. He was convinced that Vietnam had no plan to 
attack Thailand. However, he warned that if Vietnam had evidence of 
Thai support for the Khmer Rouge, it might then prepare to attack 
Thai1and in reta1iation.
For the Philippines, the main threat to ASEAN has been, and 
continues to be, insurgency. This assessment reflects the pressing 
internal problems which arise from insurgency. The Philippines is 
strongly anti-communist and is suspicious of all communist actors in 
the region. Thus it has resisted entanglement in Thailand's problems 
although, for the sake of ASEAN solidarity, it is willing to join the 
Association's condemnations of Vietnamese actions.1
Apart from this concentration on insurgency, some other factors 
also contribute to the Philippines' limited interest in the Kampuchean 
problem. One is that its physical distance from the situation means 
that it is little affected by the altered situation. Another is that 
the presence of American bases has provided a guarantee of Philippines 
national security to a certain extent, at least against attack by a 
local power.
Singapore: a very close ally to Thailand
Singapore's position is the most extremely supportive of 
Thailand. Contrary to other ASEAN members, Singapore conjured up a very 
different context for the need for solidarity with Thailand and ASEAN.
1 Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security,
Hoover Institution Press, 1982, p.102
31
Singaporean officials have clearly expressed their interpreta­
tion of the Kampuchean conflict as being part of a spreading pattern of 
aggression directed by the Soviet Union, and hence requiring
countervai1ing big power pressure. This view has remained unchanged 
since the start of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1979. For 
instance, soon after the invasion the then Minister of State , for 
Foreign Affairs, S. Dhanabalan, declared that Singapore may have to put 
aside a "puristic idea of non-alignment" and seek big power backing if 
Singapore's security is threatened.1 He also added that Vietnam, which 
could prevent big power involvement in the area, has found the 
involvement of the Soviet power to its advantage and therefore has not 
left the other states in Southeast Asia with much of a choice to remain 
free of big power pressures. In a speech on February 15, 1980, the
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew insisted that any attack on Thailand was an 
attack on ASEAN.2 Singapore’s concern has been to mobilize
international recognition of the danger of a conflict embroiling 
Thailand which would widen the area of devastation and conflict beyond 
the territory of Kampuchea.
The former Foreign Minister of Singagore, S. Rajaratnam, sees 
the issue as initially a step towards establishing Vietnam's hegemony 
over Laos and Kampuchea and at the same time serving as a stage in a 
protracted Sino-Soviet war.3 Rajaratnam has also emphasized that 
Singapore wants to see Southeast Asia free of any great power domination 
and to see Vietnam independent even if it is a communist state.
1 Hans H. Indorf and Astri Suhrke, "Indochina: The Nemesis of 
ASEAN?", Southeast Asian Affairs 1981, p.69.
2 K.Das, "Search for signs of a thaw", FEER, 25 January, 
1980. pp.28-29.
Estrella D. Solidum, "Some innovative approaches to 
international relations: the view from Southeast Asia", Asia Pacific 
Community: A Quarterly Review, Fall 1985, p.99.
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Furthermore, long-term implications of what happened in 
Kampuchea have begun to cause serious concern among ASEAN states. When 
Hanoi established "KNUFNS" to liberate Phnom Penh from the Pol Pol 
government, Rajaratnam expressed his fear pointedly. After noting that 
now "Thailand is on the frontline”, he added that!
”The Vietnamese have set up a Cambodian National 
Salvation Front. We are concerned whether two years 
from now it would be necessary to set up a salvation 
front for (other) ASEAN countries.”1 2
It is obvious that Singapore has taken a far more forceful 
position in the issue, especially in supporting Thailand, than other 
ASEAN members. Presuming to speak for all ASEAN nations, Singapore 
bitterly condemned Vietnam for its invasion of Kampuchea and for 
creating the tragedy of the boat people. At the ASEAN Conference in 
Bali in 1979, Rajaratnam urged ASEAN jointly to support Thailand, which 
is the most vulnerable of all the members, and also warned of falling 
dominoes.3
There are reasons for Singapore's position of rejecting a great 
power dominance in the Kampuchean issue and of supporting Thailand. 
First is that Singapore probably has a deep sense of vulnerability 
because of the tiny size of the island-state. This apprehension has 
been reflected in Singapore's vehement protests when principles of 
territorial integrity are violated by open invasions. Second, Singapore 
perhaps sees itself as a spokesman for Thai views which Thai officials 
-closer to Vietnam- are reluctant to articulate. Third, but less 
convincing, is that Singapore's predominantly Chinese ethnic populations
1 Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Cambodian Conflict in Southeast 
Asia’s Strategic Considerations", Asian Profile, April 1980, vol.8, 
no.2, p .183.
2 Asia 1980 Yearbook, p.276.
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s y m p a th iz e  w i th  C h in a ,  and V ie tn a m 's  i n v a s i o n  o f  Kampuchea c o n s t i t u t e s  
a s a f e  i s s u e  t o  e x p r e s s  t h e i r  v iew  w i t h o u t  c r e a t i n g  a n x ie t y  in  
S i n g a p o r e ’ s p r e d o m in a n t ly  M a la y s ia n  n e ig h b o u r s .
T h a i l a n d :  r e a c t i o n s  t o  ASEAN’ s d i f f e r e n t  v iew s
W hile  some ASEAN members, n o t a b l y  I n d o n e s ia  and M a la y s ia ,  h o ld  
s t r o n g  v iew s  a g a i n s t  t h e  PRC and a r e  more c o m f o r ta b le  i n  s i d i n g  w i th  
V ie tn a m 's  i n t e r e s t s ,  T h a i la n d  h as  c la im e d  t h a t  appeasem en t o f  Vietnam  
d o e s  n o t  make i t s  a c t i o n s  more a c c e p t a b l e ,  a s  Vietnam has  had 
h i s t o r i c a l  a m b i t i o n s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  i n f l u e n c e .
A f t e r  t h e  V ie tn a m ese  in v a s io n  o f  Kampuchea, T h a i la n d  has  
n a t u r a l l y  e x p e c t e d  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  from  h e r  ASEAN f r i e n d s  who, in  t u r n ,  
s t r o n g l y  e n d o rs e d  T h a i l a n d ' s  p o s i t i o n  in  condem ning t h e  V ie tnam ese  
m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n .
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  T h a i la n d  h as  d e f i n e d  i t s  s e c u r i t y  needs  a s  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  f r i e n d l y  b u f f e r s  a g a i n s t  Vietnam  in  Laos and 
Kampuchea. The l o s s  o f  a  Khmer b u f f e r  s t a t e  h a s  b ro u g h t  T h a i la n d  f a c e  
t o  f a c e  w i th  V ie tn a m e se  t r o o p s .  G iven t h e  u n s e t t l e d  c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  
b o r d e r  and c o n t i n u e d  f i g h t i n g  be tw een  Khmer Rouge and Khmer S e r e i  
g u e r r i l l a s  (who s e e k  r e f u g e  and s u p p o r t  on t h e  Thai s i d e  o f  t h e  b o rd e r )  
and V ie tn am ese  r e g u l a r s ,  t h e r e  i s  a lw ays  a p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u n c o n t r o l l e d  
e s c a l a t i o n  o f  armed c o n f l i c t  i n v o lv in g  T h a i l a n d . 1 The V ietnam ese m igh t 
a l s o  make i n c u r s i o n s  i n t o  Thai t e r r i t o r y ,  a s  h a s  happened  in  t h e  p a s t ,  
Such moves would s e r v e  V ie tnam ese  t a c t i c s  t o  p u n i s h  T h a i la n d  b o th  f o r  
a s s i s t i n g  t h e  Khmer Rouge and f o r  f a c i l i t a t i o n  C h in e se  s u p p l i e s  t o  them .
Second, t h e  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  V ie tnam ese  p r e s e n c e  in  Kampuchea 
has  g e n e r a l l y  made t h e  r e g i o n a l  b a la n c e  o f  power t i l t  t o  V ietnam . 
V ie tnam  may now u s e  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  in  Kampuchea a g a i n s t  T h a i la n d  in  
v a r i o u s  ways, i n c l u d i n g  s u p p o r t  f o r  Thai i n s u r g e n t s .  Moreover, s i n c e  
V ie tnam  h a s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n f l u e n c e  in  Laos, i t  means t h a t  V ie tn a m 's
I n d o r f ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .6 8 .
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present sphere of influence in the region is wider and that Thailand 
has to face the Vietnamese preponderance along both of eastern and 
northeastern borders and, as the Thai-Kampuchean border is relatively 
close to Bangkok, Vietnamese troops along that border are viewed with 
particular apprehension.
However, Thailand's concern over ASEAN differences was clearly 
affirmed when Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian Premier Dato 
Hussein Onn formulated a so-called "Kuantan Principle" in March 1980.1 *
The main points of the principle were that great powers should refrain 
from involvement in the Kampuchean crisis and that interest of Vietnam 
must be preserved.3
Although official Thai reactions were not explicit in order not 
to insult their ASEAN partners, it proved an abortive initiative. 
Visiting Jakarta shortly after the Kuantan talks, Thai Prime Minister 
Prem rejected the principle by emphasizing that considering ASEAN's
1 After the fall of the Kriangsak government, Indonesia feared 
that Thailand was already heading towards political chaos, which they 
thought Peking would be quick to exploit. According to Indonesia, this 
was the atmosphere in which the leaders of the two ASEAN members 
(Indonesia and Malaysia) agreed in principle that it would be better to 
reach some accommodations with Hanoi over Kampuchea than to allow 
Thailand to tumble willy-nilly into China's lap. See Richard Nations,
"Prem takes peace hopes one step further", FEER, 9 May, 1980, p.12.
3 See K.Das , "The Kuantan Principle', FEER, 4 April,1980, 
pp.12-13. And also Richard Nations, "The Kuantan Principle: the looming 
split of the Five", FEER, 20 June, 1980, p.12.
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earlier criticism of Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea, the time 
seemed hardly appropriate to be making new overtures to Vietnam. He 
also noted that the Thai government was not about to collapse,1 and 
that it did not intend to provoke the Vietnamese by allowing Thai 
territory to be used for the benefit of Pol Pot's guerrillas.2
From the Thai viewpoint, ASEAN has to face the delicate 
manoeuvre of having closer links with the PRC, which alone could "teach 
a lesson to Vietnam".3 The closer cooperation between Thailand and 
China is obvious since the course of developments in Indochina in 
1979-1980. For Thai officials, China has clearly emerged as Thailand's 
de facto ally, principally because the PRC could bring pressure on a 
Soviet-supported Vietnam and so deter a Vietnamese attack on Thailand. 
Contrary to Indonesia and Malaysia, the Thais have viewed the Chinese 
as an important strategic deterrent against a major attack on Thailand; 
and although deterrence can fail, the PRC's apparently important 
interest in containing and pressuring Vietnam suggests that Thailand 
can rely on the self-interest of Chinese leaders to honour its de facto 
alliance.* Moreover, the military threat becomes less critical to
1 With the political confusion following the fall of Kriangsak 
government only a month before the Kuantan talks, and the expectation 
that the new government of Prem augured an intensifying and uncertain 
power struggle between the Thai armed forces and the political parties, 
Thailand, in the perceptions of Onn and Suharto, appeared less able 
than ever to meet the chaos of conflict along its Kampuchean border. 
See Simon, op.cit., p.98.
Somphong Choomak, Southeast Asian Security in the Light of 
the Kampuchean Crisis, (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University), 1985, p.72.
3 Choudhury, op.cit., p.44.
* Indorf, op.cit., p.68.
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Thailand, on the grounds that Vietnam's ability to make either tactical 
or strategic strikes on Thailand is limited by a possible Chinese 
retaliatory move. Although Vietnam has approximately twice the number 
of armed forces that Thailand has, half them are tied down on the Sino- 
Vietnamese border.
However, too close an association with China not only has the 
obvious danger of provoking Vietnam but might also cause apprehension 
among some ASEAN members. In an implicit effort to maintain its 
independent and territorial integrity, Thailand adopted a policy that 
happened to parallel that of China. This has appeared to place Bangkok 
on the Beijing side of both the Sino-Vietnamese and the Sino-Soviet 
contlicts, and also seems to undermine ASEAN's stated posture of 
neutra1ity.
It is, however, by no means clear that Thailand, during the 
period of Kriangsak government, had complete freedom of action in her 
relations with China. For Thailand, the first reason to be friendly 
with China was that China has been very useful in helping to create an 
opposition to Vietnamese hegemony over Kampuchea. Thailand's action in 
allowing the Khmer Rouge to use its territory for sanctuary has also 
probably resulted in a guarantee by China of Thai security.1 Moreover, 
the Kriangsak government also saw the economic benefits of close 
relations with China.
However, while Kriangsak'srpolicy was to become friendly with 
the PRC and to become involved in supporting the Kampuchean resistance, 
he certainly did not abandon his efforts to achieve detente with
1 China has dropped its support to most communist movements in 
Southeast Asia, though it has not broken all links. China claims that 
a complete break would only result in Moscow penetrating the movements. 
In Thailand, one result has been the surrender of hundreds of elsewhile 
insurgents. See Copper, op.cit., p.56.
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Vietnam and Laos, as the benefits of so doing were the cessation of 
their support to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Kriangsak still 
followed his omni-directional policy; he opposed Vietnam's role in 
Kampuchea but at the same time he claimed that Thailand and Vietnam 
shared a fundamental long-term strategic interest in preventing the 
spread of Chinese influence southwards.1
Under the Prem government, however, Thai attitudes are tougher 
than those of the Kriangsak administration. Thai views of the 
Kampuchean conflict have become very close to those of the PRC; 
further, a large-scale repatriation of Kampuchean refugees was 
initiated in June 1980. Thailand thus moved towards a more 
confrontationist posture in regard to Kampuchea, which would widen the 
policy differences with Indoriesia and Malaysia.
Since Thailand's alignment with China stimulated Indonesian and 
Malaysian fears that ASEAN is being used by the Chinese as a means of 
asserting diplomatic influence in the region, the Thai public position 
has been a calculated attempt to preserve the superficial appearance of 
ASEAN unity over the issue. Since ASEAN sees its long-term security in 
regional neutrality rather than in alignment with China, Thailand's 
desire not to openly acknowledge its close relation with China is 
particularly important. This policy was demonstrated when General Prem 
promised General Suharto that Thailand would not permit China to use 
Thai territory for any massive supply of arms to the Khmer Rouge.2 
This promise has served to reassure both Indonesia and Malaysia that 
Thailand has not opted for the PRC and so is not undermining ASEAN 
neutrality.
1 Huxley, op.cit., p.48.
2 Richard Nations, "Prem takes peace hopes one step further",
FEER, 9 May,1980, p.12.
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Yet apprehension has arisen nob only among ASEAN members but 
also among Thai officials. Some Thai leaders would prefer to see 
Thailand distance itself from the PRC over the long run. It has been 
argued in some Thai official circles that although the PRC presently 
has dissociated itself from Thai insurgents, China's long-term 
ambitions in the region cannot necessarily be taken to coincide with 
Thai interests. Consequently, to compromise both with other ASEAN 
members and among the Thais themselves, Thailand has declared that in 
foreign policy formulation it is neutral with respect to the Kampuchean 
conf1ict.
Moreover, it is not generally understood that the Thais are by 
no means strongly pro-Chinese. There is a considerable body of opinion 
in the government and military leadership which is as suspicious of the 
Chinese as of the Vietnamese and the Soviet Union.1 Indeed, these 
points of view are quite realistic; but the Thai policy is apparently 
based on the belief that Chinese involvement in Thailand and elsewhere 
in the region will only decline when the Vietnamese withdraw from 
Kampuchea.
For ASEAN, the hope is that the present close association« of 
Thailand with China is only temporary and is related to the issue of 
Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. The reality, however, is likely to 
be somewhat more complex. Thailand and the PRC do share a short-term 
interest in seeking the Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea but their 
longer-term aims do not necessarily coincide. Thailand, like other 
ASEAN states, would like to preserve Vietnam as a regional
1 Kramol Tongdhamachart, Thai perspectives of the Conflict in
t Kampuchea in Graduate School Journal, Chulalongkorn University, 1982 pp.
136-144
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counterweight to Chinese influence. The PRC, however, seeks Vietnam's 
humi1iat ion. The vulnerability of Thailand's policy is that it only 
links its alignment of policy with Chinese aims over the short-term 
issue, but this issue also provides the Chinese an opportunity of 
pursuing their long-term purpose, indeed, Vietnam's collapse, which 
would make the PRC a dominant power in the Southeast Asian region, 
would greatly disturb not only Indonesia and Malaysia but also all the 
other ASEAN members.
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CHAPTER 3
PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT
"To some, we may appear to be preoccupied with the 
Kampuchean problem, and at the same time, being 
inflexible in our search for a solution. Regarding 
the allegation of inflexibility, I can only state 
again what I have said so many times before, the door 
to further means of peaceful solution stands open.
Others need only across the threshold."1
After seven years of posturing and calling for talks, the 
conflicting parties to the Kampuchean problem have faced the fact that 
the conflict is far from being settled. All proposals raised by either 
side were viewed by the other as actually nothing more than propaganda 
manoeuvres.
In attempting to consider prospects for a settlement of the 
Kampuchean conflict, it might be useful firstly to discuss the
objectiues of all related parties to the conflict, Vietnam and the Heng 
Samrin on the one hand, and the PRC and ASEAN on the other, for such 
considerations would help elucidate their pre-conditions for any 
settlement. Then Thailand's attempt to solve the problem will be 
considered.
In directly involving itself in the Kampuchean conflict, 
Vietnam's conditions for settlement are quite obvious. Already having 
controlled most of Kampuchean territory and being confident that time 
is on its side, Vietnam seeks to localize the Kampuchean issue. It 
thus refused to discuss the issue in its bilateral negotiations with 
China. Vietnam repeatedly proclaimed that any attempt to promote a
1 ACM.Siddhi Savetsila, "Trends in Thai Foreign Policy", 
Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand,
no.6/1982, p.7
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political solution to the Kampuchean question or to hold an
international forum was both unnecessary and unwarranted, and indeed 
constituted a "gross interference in the internal affairs of
Kampuchea"1. For Vietnam, the Kampuchean problem is the question of 
Chinese expansionism against the Kampuchean people through the Pol Pot 
regime, thereby threatening the survival of Vietnam. Vietnam thus 
tries to persuade its Southeast Asian neighbours of the necessity to 
accept the status quo in Kampuchea, thereby effectively undercutting 
Chinese diplomatic efforts and the entire resistance forces.
Vietnam sees its relation with the ASEAN members, especially 
Thailand, as largely conditioned by the latter's connections with 
external power. In Vietnam's view, Beijing and the Kampuchean 
reactionaries have b Iso carried out coordinated operations with the US 
Navy and Thai Armed Forces at sea, committing provocations and 
threatening the security and territory of Kampuchea.2 Vietnamese 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has asserted that as far as Hanoi is 
concerned, "We do not see major obstacles to the door of relations 
between Thailand and Vietnam because the two countries’ interests do 
not come into conflict".3 However, Hanoi has also issued a warning 
that Thai support for Pol Pot and the coalition is a "pernicious 
mistake".* Moreover, the main problem with Thailand, in Vietnam's view, 
is that it has allowed itself to be used by the PRC, which has had to 
rely on Thailand because of its limited means of influencing the 
situation in Kampuchea, and that this has created more opportunities
1 Chang Pao-min, "Beijing Versus Hanoi: The Diplomacy over
Kampuchea", Asian Survey, vol.22, no.5, May 1983, p.607.
2 Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, "The Vietnam's view" in Donald E. 
Weatherbee (ed.), Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis, 
(Boulder and London: Westview Press), 1985, p.3.
3 FBIS, 10 February 1983, K8.
Ibid., K5.
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for China to interfere more deeply in Thailand's internal affairs. The 
implication is that if Thailand were to end its support of Pol Pot and 
the coalition, there would be no direct conflicts of interest between 
the two countries.
Vietnam has tried to counter Thailand's attempt to broaden 
the Kampuchean question and place it in a UN framework by insisting 
that the issue be settled regionally between ASEAN and Indochinese 
countries. For Vietnam, it is obvious that the situation in Kampuchea 
has been normalised and, if only other ASEAN members could dissuade 
Thailand from cooperating with China in backing Pol Pot, peace and 
stability would return to the region.1 * And Vietnam would not leave 
Kampuchea until a solution is found which does not overlook Vietnam's 
security interest.
As Vietnam's dependence on the Soviets is substantial, the 
direct involvement of the latter would suggest that a Kampuchean 
settlement would require its participation. It is worth mentioning - 
although the event is slightly outside the time of this sub-thesis - that 
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze made it clear during his 
visit to the Asia-Pacific region in March 1987 that Moscow would not 
force Hanoi to settle the Kampuchean conflict. In attempting to solve 
the conflict, Shevardnadze responded with new (according to him) Soviet 
proposals that:
"Although we have a certain means of settlement, we 
will not allow ourselves to force any democatic state 
to accept it.....We have stressed everywhere that the 
solution to the Kampuchean problem is the affair of 
the Kampuchean people themselves."3
1 Nayan Chanda, "A subtle approach from Hanoi", FEER, 8 
February 1980, p.17.
Murray Heibert,"The subtlest hint", FEER, 25 March 1987, p.17.
3 Shevardnadze responded in an interview in Laos broadcast by 
Vientiane radio on 12 March 1987.
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The o b j e c t i v e s  o f  C h i n a 's  d ip lom acy  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  Kampuchean 
i s s u e  a r e  a l s o  o b v io u s .  U nab le  t o  p r o v id e  t h e  o u s te d  Khmer reg im e  w i th  
m ass iv e  m a t e r i a l  a id  in  i t s  armed s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  V ie tnam , t h e  PRC 
se e k s  t o  g e n e r a t e  a s  much o f  an  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  V ie tnam ese  o c c u p a t io n  
a s  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e r e b y  p r e v e n t i n g  Hanoi from  l e g i t i m i z i n g  i t s  c o n q u e s t . 1 
The PRC hopes t o  win t h e  sym pathy and s u p p o r t  o f  a l l  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia n  
c o u n t r i e s  f o r  t h e  Khmer r e s i s t a n c e  movement.
The c o n d i t i o n s  p u t  f o r t h  by China f o r  Kampuchean s e t t l e m e n t  a r e ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  opposed  t o  t h o s e  o f  V ie tnam . When Vietnam d e s c r i b e d  t h e  
c o n f l i c t  a s  a l o c a l  o n e ,  t h e  PRC con tended  t h a t  t h e  V ie tn a m ese  
o c c u p a t io n  o f  Kampuchea was n o t  an  " i s o l a t e d  e v e n t"  o r  " l o c a l  i s s u e " , “ 
s i n c e  i t  n o t  o n ly  r e v e a l e d  H a n o i 's  a m b i t io n  t o  dom ina te  a l l  In d o c h in a  
b u t  a l s o  r e p r e s e n t e d  "an  im p o r ta n t  component o f  t h e  S o v i e t  a t t e m p t  t o  
f u r t h e r  i t s  s t r a t e g y  o f  s e e k in g  w orld  hegemony". M oreover, from  t h e  
C h in ese  v iew , V ietnam  i n v i t e d  t h e  S o v i e t s  in  because  i t  needed  t h e i r  
s u p p o r t  in  r e a l i s i n g  i t s  r e g i o n a l  a m b i t i o n s .  And t h e  S o v i e t  Union 
backed V ie tnam , a s  C hina  s e e s  i t ,  b e c a u s e  i t  needed Vietnam  in  o r d e r  t o  
"push  i t s  p o l i c y  o f  d r i v i n g  s o u th  CtoD l in k  up i t s  s t r a t e g i c  
dep lo y m en ts  in  t h e  P a c i f i c  and t h e  In d ia n  O c e a n ."3
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  Kampuchean i s s u e ,  China a rg u e d ,  was n o t  so  much 
a m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  c o n f l i c t  be tw een  China and Vietnam o r  be tw een  t h e  
I n d o c h in e s e  and o t h e r  S o u t h e a s t  A s ian  s t a t e s  a s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  and 
V ie tnam ese  t h r e a t  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  r e g i o n .  China would n e v e r  a c c e p t  a 
f e d e r a t i o n  o f  In d o c h in e s e  s t a t e s  u n d e r  t h e  dominance o f  a S o v i e t -  
s u p p o r te d  Vietnam  a lo n g  i t s  s o u th e r n  b o r d e r .  In o r d e r  t o  check " S o v i e t -  
V ie tnam ese  e x p a n s io n "  i n  t h e  S o u t h e a s t  A sian  r e g i o n ,  China from  t h e  
v e ry  b e g in n in g  p le d g e d  f u l 1 s u p p o r t  f o r  a l l  p r o p o s a l s  o r  f o rm u la s  t h a t  
c a l l e d  f o r  an im m edia te  and c o m p le te  w ith d raw a l  o f  V ie tnam ese  t r o o p s
1 Chang Pao-m in , c p . c i t . ,  p ,5 9 8 .  
“ I b i d . ,  p . 599.
I b i d .
from Kampuchea as the prerequisite for any political settlement of the 
problem. However, in a further gesture of solidarity with the ASEAN 
states, towards the end of 1980 China decided to drop its demand for at 
least a partial Vietnamese withdrawal .of a prerequisite for holding an 
international Conference on Kampuchea (KCK),1 in order to sustain the 
momentum of political pressure on Vietnam.2
While ASEAN is as worried as is China about the Vietnamese 
occupation of Kampuchea, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua in 
1980 received differing reactions to his hawkish approach to the 
problem.3 Huang's line, as expressed in Singapore, was that if the 
Khmer guerrillas (he gave their strength as 30,000)* were kept in 
battle condition long enough, a time could come when Hanoi and Moscow 
would, in effect, sue for peace by seeking a political settlement. 
That, according to Huang, would be the time to consider negotiating 
with the Vietnamese. The problem with the Chinese is that they 
disagreed with any solution that would weaken their Khmer Rouge ally. 
They even rejected the ASEAN call for the disarming of the Khmer 
factions after the Vietnamese withdrawal. Some Thais thought that 
Chinese disagreement with the ASEAN proposals could disprove 
allegations of connivance between China and ASEAN, and would possibly 
make the Vietnamese more amenable to them. One opinion was that
1 The United Nations convened the ICK from 13-17 duly 1981, 
with the aim of finding a comprehensive political settlement of the 
Kampuchean problem. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents on the 
Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985, (Bangkok, Thailand), pp.123-124.
2 Chang Pao-min, op.cit., p.603.
3 K.Das, "Peking sends out a hawk", and Jusuf Wanandi, "An 
Indonesian View", FEER, 28 March,1980, pp.15-16.
Ibid.
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Vietnam  can  j o i n  ASEAN t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  C h in ese  d o m in a t io n  o f  
Kam puchea.1 T h is  v iew , how ever, was n o t  s h a re d  by Thai l e a d e r s  who 
make t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n s .
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  prob lem  re m a in s  f o r  China t h a t  a l t h o u g h  m ost o f  
t h e  n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  w o r ld ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  ASEAN n a t i o n s ,  oppose  
V ie tn a m 's  o c c u p a t io n  o f  Kampuchea, t h e y  c a n n o t  be p e rsu a d e d  t o  s im p ly  
s u p p o r t  C h i n a 's  h a rd  l i n e  p o s i t i o n  w hich  in c lu d e s  u n q u a l i f i e d  s u p p o r t  
f o r  Pol P o t and e x p e l l i n g  V ie tn am ese  f o r c e s  from  Kampuchea a t  any 
c o s t . 2 The UN and t h e  West f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t ,  p e rh a p s  im p o s s ib l e ,  t o  
s u p p o r t  Pol P o t ,  who i s  r e g a r d e d  a s  t h e  w o rs t  v i o l a t o r  o f  human r i g h t s . 3
D e s p i te  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  among th e m s e lv e s ,  t h e  ASEAN members 
have  p r e s e n t e d  common i n i t i a t i v e s  in  t h e  UN. G e n e r a l ly ,  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
r e s p o n s e  o f  ASEAN h a s  been  t o  deny  l e g i t i m a c y  t o  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in  
Phnom Penh t o  u p h o ld  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s  and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
D em ocra tic  Kampuchea. S in c e  t h e  o c c u p a t io n  o f  Kampuchea i n  1979, t h e y  
have  a c h ie v e d  a d e g re e  o f  s o l i d a r i t y .  They have in t r o d u c e d  and 
d e v e lo p e d  t o  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  e f f i c a c y  c e r t a i n  r u l e s  o f  t h e  game f o r  t h e  
management o f  r e l a t i o n s  among t h e m s e l v e s . A One p r i n c i p l e  i s  t h a t ,  no  
m a t t e r  whBt e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  member s t a t e ' s  p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s  may b e ,  t h e  
ASEAN c o n u t r i e s  a r e  com m itted  t o  s e c u r i n g  a p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  in  
Kampuchea. A n o th e r  i s  t h a t  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d in g  t h a t ,  a g a in  n o 'm a t t e r  what
1 Theh C h o n g k h a d ik i j ,  Bangkok P o s t , 13 J u l y  1981. q u o ted  in  
B u s z y n s k i .
2 K. Das, o p . c i t .
3 John  F. C opper, "C hina  and S o u th e a s t  A s ia " ,  in  W ea therbee ,  
o p . c i t . , p .5 0 .
* Sukhumbhand P a r i b a t r a ,  Between Watana Nakorn and t h e  UNGAt 
The Growing D e lu s io n  in  ASEAN's Diplomacy Towards t h e  Cambodian 
C o n f1ict^, P a p e r  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  Second M eeting  o f  ASEAN ISIS a t  K uala
Lumpur, 12-16 J u n e , 19 8 6 . ,  p . 8 .
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each individual member state's aspirations or reservations may be, the 
security interests and requirements of Thailand receive first priority 
in all questions related to the Kampuchean problem.
Clearly, ASEAN's main objective has been to maintain and 
improve the support given to the government of Democratic Kampuchea at 
the UN General Assembly. And as the Khmer Rouge, one faction of the 
CGDK, appeared to be the only effective opposition to Vietnam's 
dominance of Kampuchea and generally of Indochina, the ASEAN states 
have laid the groundwork for a settlement of the problem by, among other 
things, motivating the Kampuchean resistance forces to work together 
against the Vietnamese occupation. Aparting from fostering the CGDK 
and denying recognition to the Heng Samrin regime, ASEAN has also worked 
towards the diplomatic and economic isolation of Vietnam by canvassing 
international condemnation of Vietnamese behaviour in Kampuchea.
Moreover, ASEAN has pursued its policy which sought primarily to 
internationalise the Kampuchean issue. Given the faith that ASEAN 
states had put in the Kampuchean resistance movement, it felt that an 
internationalisation of the problem wolkd facilitate a political solution 
by increasing the pressure on Vietnam to negotiate and to withdraw troops 
from Kampuchea.1
ASEAN's strategy has been to deny the Vietnamese claim that the 
situation in Kampuchea is irreversible, thereby refusing to engage in 
any direct negotiation with the Heng Samrin government lest this be
1 K.K .Nair, ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics 
of Accommodation, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no.3, 1984,
p . 1 2 7 .
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seen as an acceptance of that government's legitimacy. Instead, ASEAN 
has proposed several .initial steps that Tcould be taken to facilitate a 
comprehensive political settlement. For example, the ASEAN Joint 
Appeal of September 1983 proposed phased troop withdrawals on a 
territorial basis, ceasefire in safe areas, and introduction of 
peace-keeping and observer groups to monitor the withdrawals .and 
ceasefire.1
However, the ASEAN members are concerned about future support 
for the Khmer Rouge regime, unless the Khmer Rouge changed its 
leadership by including a wider spectrum c-f anti-Vietnamese
Kampucheans. They recognised that their effort to broaden the DK 
government required the cooperation of China. Towands this end, the 
ASEAN states, Thailand and Singapore in particular, attempted to 
persuade the Chinese government to agree to broadening of the DK 
government. In November 1980 the Thai And Singaporean premiers visited 
Beijing to discuss with their Chinese counterpart the question of their 
support of the Khmer Rouge group. In attempting to be flexible towards 
Vietnam, the two ASEAN members proposed that the Khmer Rouge leaders be 
dropped from the government or, if that was not possible, that the 
government of DK be revised to include leaders of the other 
anti-Vietnamese resistance movements. However, as the Khmer Rouge was 
an effective anti-Vietnamese fighting force, the Chinese leaders were 
reluctant to accept such proposals.2
Therefore, the problem with the ASEAN proposal was that it 
could not assure the Vietnamese that a pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge regime 
w’ould mot emerge after the withdrawal of the. Vietnamese forces. This
1 See details in the full text of ASEAN Joirrt Appeal made on 21 
Seiptember, 1983 in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit,. p.104.
2 Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Cambodism Problem", Asian
S u r v e y June 1982, p.550.
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was reiterated by Pham Binh in a seminar organised by the CSIS and Viet­
nam, responding to the so-called ASEAN -Joint Appeal of September 1983, 
that:
"The ASEAN solution is not acceptable because 
it demands that Vietnam unilaterally withdraw its 
troops while China is free unilaterally to 
maintain its threat, Thai territory is free to 
be used against the Indochinese countries, and Pol 
Pot is free to carry on activities against the 
Kampuchean people.1
ASEAN: Different Approaches To Settlements
From the beginning the ASEAN states have taken the view that a 
compromise was necessary for the sake of the region's stability as well 
as for Vietnam's own sake. A prolonged conflict would only burden 
Vietnam with the necessity of maintaining a large standing army, and 
would increase its dependence on the Soviet Union. However, although 
the ASEAN governments have publicly given highest priority to the Thai 
viewpoint, there are differences among them rgarding their assessments 
of the conflict and on ways and means of solving it.
In October 1980, for example, Indonesia seemed to favour the 
Vietnamese proposal for a partial withdrawal from Kampuchea in return 
for Thai withdrawal from supporting the Khmer Rouge. Such favour was 
shown when Indonesia maintained that the ASEAN resolution in the UN was 
an expression of support for the principle of self-determination for the 
Kampucheans, not an expression of support for the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, 
when President Suharto visited Bangkok in March 1981, apparently one of 
his objectives was to persuade the Thai premier to conduct a dialogue 
with the Vietnamese government. Within the ASEAN framework, it seems 
that Indonesia wishes to reach an approach to settlement which
1 See Susumu Awanchara, "The pace quickens", FEER, 15 
March,1984, pp.15-17.
Wanandi, op.cit., p.36
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m a i n t a i n s  good r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  ASEAN and t h e  In d o ch in e se  s t a t e s .  The 
I n d o n e s i a n s  a r e  c o n v in c e d  t h a t  any com prom ise by Vietnam w i l l  be 
m atched  by more f o r th c o m in g  ASEAN p r o p o s a l s . 1
F u r th e r m o r e ,  i n  e a r l y  1981 i n d i v i d u a l  ASEAN governm ents t a l k e d  
i n  t e r m s  o f  a  " t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e "  t o  t h e  Khmer Rouge and t h e  Heng 
S am rin  r e g im e s .  The s o - c a l l e d  " t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e "  su g g e s te d  a form o f  
Kampuchean governm en t  t h a t  n e i t h e r  Heng S a m r in 's  n o r  Khieu Sam pan 's 
r e g im e  m ig h t  em erge  from  e l e c t i o n s .  I n d o n e s i a  and M alays ia  adop ted  a 
m o d e ra te  v iew  a s  op p o sed  t o  a h a rd  l i n e  to w a rd s  V ietnam , and hoped t h a t  
T h a i l a n d  would l i k e w i s e  a d o p t  a more f l e x i b l e  a t t i t u d e  to w ard s  Vietnam2 . 
I t  was a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  ASEAN s h o u ld  r e c o g n i s e  V ie tnam ese  s e c u r t i t y  
c o n c e r n s ,  and a t  t h e  same t im e  e m p h a z ise  t h e  need t o  a l l e v i a t e  p r e s s u r e  
on  T h a i l a n d .  The T hai p rim e m i n i s t e r ,  how ever , e x p re s s e d  u n h a p p in e ss  
o v e r  t h e  In d o n e s ia n  a p p ro a c h .
I t  was commented by t h e  T h a i s  t h a t  t h e  main problem  w i th  
I n d o n e s i a ' s  p l a n ,  w h ich  t h e  T h a is  fo u n d  e x t r e m e ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  B ccep t,  
was t h a t  t h e  p l a n  so u g h t  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  Khmer Rouge from s h a r in g  some 
o f  t h e  power t h r o u g h  an e l e c t i o n ,  a s  t h i s ,  from  t h e  Thai v ie w p o in t ,  
would  c o n s p ic u o u s ly  v i o l a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  in  
d o m e s t ic  a f f a i r s  o f  o t h e r s . 3 But a p p a r e n t l y  T h a i l a n d ' s  f l e x i b i l i t y  was 
d e m o n s t r a te d  when t h e  Thai e x p r e s s e d  t h e  v iew  t h a t  i f  T h a i lan d  and 
ChinB w ere  t o  s to p  a i d i n g  t h e  Khmer Rouge, t h e  l a t t e r  would f lo u n d e r  in  
f o u r  t o  s i x  m on ths ,  w i t h o u t  b e in g  a b l e  t o  t h r e a t e n  T h a i l a n d 's  s e c u r i t y  
s e r i o u s l y .  One i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i f  t h e  q u id  p ro  puo i s  r i g h t ,  t h e  
T h a i s  m ig h t  a g r e e  t o  d ro p  t h e  Khmer R o u g e .A
1 W anandi, o p . c i t . ,  p .3 6
2 Lau T e ik  Soon, o p . c i t . ,  p .5 5 1 .
3
Susumu, o p . c i t . , p .1 7 .
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Thailand: A Flexible Approach
With regard to the Kampuchean issue, according to Thai Foreign 
Minister Siddhi Savetsila, Thailand would continue lending political 
and diplomatic support to the DK government under the leadership of 
Sihanouk in its struggle to restore full independence and sovereignty 
to Kampuchea.1 * Siddhi consistently called for a political settlement 
and for a clearly defined geographic area from which Vietnamese troops 
should withdraw. He attempted to assure Vietnamese Foreign Minister 
Thach of his flexiblity in order to get a settlement that could be 
satisfactory to all parties, He also reportedly offered to be an 
intermediary between Vietnam and China if it were true that the 
solution of the Kampuchean problem depended on relations between the 
two countries.“
Generally, the Thais wished to see the Kampuchean conflict 
settled by an international agreement. This has repeatedly stated by 
Siddhi:
".... This [the Kampuchean problem] is a classic case of
internal problems becoming regionalised by the outside 
intervention of a local power, and finally internationalised 
by support from two of the major powers tb the contending 
factions. The magnitude of the involvement by major powers 
has made the situation an international problem requiring an 
international solution."3
1 The Bangkok Post "The full text of Foreign Minister Siddhi 
Savetsila's address at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thai land",28 
June 1984.
Solidum, op.cit., p.90.
3 Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 11/82 (16 June 1982) "The full 
text of opening statement made by ACM Siddhi Savetsila at the fifteenth 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore", 14 June 1982.
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It seems that since the end of 1983, Thailand's stand in the 
Indochinese conflict has been somewhat more moderate than before, 
reflecting perhaps a greater willingness to improve relations with its 
neighbour to the east.1 Although the generally accepted positon was 
that Vietnam should withdraw completely from Kampuchea, Thailand was 
prepared to countenance a partial Vietnamese withdrawal if Thailand's 
security interests were protected. Indeed, in the Thai view, Vietnam 
should withdraw to at least at the east bank of the Mekong River. 
Moreover, it is obvious that a softer Thai approach was further 
reflected in the so-called "Joint Appeal", prepared during the June 
1983 ASEAN Fore ion Ministers meeting in Bangkok. While preserving the 
non-negotiab1e essential elements of the ICK formula, that is, the 
demands for a "total withdrawal" of foreign forces and for Kampuchean's 
self-determination, this proposal could be considered "new" as it 
called for a "national reconciliation" in Kampuchea which, as later 
clarified by the then Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tan Sri Ghazali 
Shafie, was intended to be one between the Heng Samrin group, the 
non-communist resistance groups and the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, the 
Joint Appeal also outlined possible steps which would be taken in 
pursuit of a comprehensive political settlement on the Kampuchean 
problem. This again was further explained by Tan Sri Ghazali that 
"peace-keeping forces-observers" groups which should be introduced to 
ensure that the withdrawals have taken place should not be under the 
UN's auspices but should take some other form and might possibly 
include the Vietnamese themselves.2
However, from the Thais point of view, the months that followed 
the Joint Appeal proposal had served to demonstrate the failure of the 
softer approach. As indicated by the Vietnamese incursion into Si Saket
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand and the search for a 
Kampuchean settlement: Is time running out?", ASEAN Forecast, May 1984., 
p'. 69.
Paribatra, op.cit.
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province at the end of March 1984, 1 2 the Thais perceived that Vietnam 
had interpreted the more moderate stand as a sign of weakness and 
division within ASEAN and Thailand, and consequently sought to exploit 
the situation both diplomatically and militarily without any genuine 
desire to seek a workable compromise. To put it in another way, there 
was a perception that the softer approach had proved counter-productive.
However, Thailand’s confidence in its capacity to cope with the 
threat arising from Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea may also be 
perceived. The Thais believed that the balance of forces was 
favourable to their cause and consequently, time was on their side. 
Firstly, the Thais perceived that Vietnam was now weakening partly 
because of the economic burden of the occupation of Kampuchea, and that 
this trend was likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Or to 
put it differently, from the Thai point of view, within certain limits 
the situation in Kampuchea began to look "reversible".3 They also hoped 
that growing strength of the Khmer Rouge would raise the cost of 
Vietnam's forces in Kampuchea. Secondly, the Thais, especially in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, perceived that ASEAN had attained a high 
level of resilience and unity, that regional cooperation had developed 
to a point where the group could tolerate a certain a level of 
intramural differences. So the Thais believed ASEAN was now bargaining 
from a position of strength, not weakness. Thirdly, the Thais, 
especially the military, believed that the country was now more assured 
of US-support than at any time since the Vietnam debacle and that this 
trend was likely to persist as the US became more assertive in the 
international arena. But the Thais were also aware that time might be
1 This happened after Nguyen Co Thach's visit to Jakarta,
Canberra Bnd Bangkok in the middle of March 1984.
2 Paribatra, op.cit.
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working against them within their own camp. There were signs of 
fatique among some Western countries, and anxiety for a solution to the 
problem which would rid them of the embarrassment of continuing to 
recognise the Pol Pot regime,1 2
The Thai Military Concerning The Kampuchean Problem
From the perspective of the military, there are valuable
\
domestic "spin-offs" from the continuing existence of the conflict
I
over Kampuchea. The Kampuchean problem seems to have given the 
military an opportunity to play an increasingly dominant role. An exter­
nal conflict is capable of making the people grow accustomed to the 
requirements of nationl security, that is, a growing defence budget and 
the centrality of the military's position in the affairs of state, as 
was commented by a Thai scholar:
"In a number of ways, Thailand is once more already becoming a 
national security state: the defence budget has grown from 2.77 per 
cent of the GDP in 1975 to 3.82 percent in 1983; the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces' extensive role in the country’s political, social and economic 
development, outlined in the Constitution, has become more prenounced 
with the promulgation of the Office of the Prime Minister's Orders 
No.66/2523 (1980) and No.65/2525 (1982); the persistent involvement of 
some military leaders in all issues of political significance has become 
readily evident; paramilitary formulations are being strengthened by 
the creation of a new elite armed unit, Santi Nimit, which has been 
given wide powers to campaign against communism,..... "a
1 Richard Nations, "A dialogue of the deaf", FEER, 30 May 
19Ö0, p.18.
2 Paribatra, op.cit., p.69.
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Moreover ,  t h e  Kampuchean c o n f l i c t  has  s e r v e d  n o t  o n l y  t o  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a s  a g roup  b u t  a l s o  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  
power based  o f  some m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  o v e r  o t h e r s .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
t h e  main b e n e f i c i a r i e s  have  been  t h o s e  who a r e  in  c h a r g e  o f  weapons 
p r o cu re m e n t  p o l i c i e s ,  arms s h ipm e n t  t o  t h e  Khmer Rouge, and s e c u r i t y  on 
t h e  Tha i-Kampuchean b o r d e r .
A l though  i t  i s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  l a c k  o f  s o l u t i o n  o r  a g re e m e n t  
on t h e  Kampuchean p rob lem  d e f i n i t e l y  c o n s t i t u t e s  a t h r e a t  t o  p e a c e  and 
s t a b i l i t y  in  t h e  r e g i o n ,  so f a r  no compromise no r  s o l u t i o n  h a s  y e t  been  
r e a c h e d .  T h i s  i s  p r o b a b l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  S o v i e t  Union and China  have  no 
immedia te  i n t e r e s t  t o  h e l p  i n  r e a c h i n g  an a g re e m e n t ,  and may e v e n  f i n d  
an a d v a n ta g e  i n  k e e p i n g  t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  p r o l o n g e d .  For  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union ,  r e t e n t i o n  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  a t  Cam Ranh Bay and Danang t o  some 
e x t e n t  depends  on c o n t i n u e d  a l i e n a t i o n  between  t h e  SRV and i t s  
n e i g h b o u r s ,  w h i l e  f o r  Ch ina  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  e n a b l e s  i t  t o  g a i n  f a v o u r  
w i t h  some ASEAN members w i t h o u t  un d u ly  a l a r m i n g  t h e  o t h e r s .
For  t h e  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  r e g i o n ,  t h e  V ie tnam ese  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  
Kampuchea i s  a m a jo r  i s s u e  and one t h a t  c o u ld  l ea d  t o  t h e  e s c a l a t i o n  o f  
g r e a t  power c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  r e g i o n .  For  t h e  PRC, t h e  Kampuchean 
c o n f l i c t  might  p r o v i d e  a good e x c u s e  t o  b l e e d  Vietnam and t o  i n c r e a s e  
i t s  i nvo lvem en t  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  And t h e  c o n f l i c t  m igh t  s t r e n g t h e n  
c o o p e r a t i o n  be tw een  Ch ina  and ASEAN, and p e r h a p s  be tween  China  and t h e  
US a s  w e l l ,  in  c o n f r o n t i n g  t h e  USSR. The C h inese  would t h u s  f a v o u r  
c o n t i n u i n g  m i l i t a r y ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s  on Vie tnam u n t i l  
t h e y  become so u n b e a r a b l e  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  c o u ld  be f o r c e d  t o  a g r e e  t o  
t o t a l  w i th d ra w a l  f rom Kampuchea.
For  t h e  USSR, i t s  i n vo lve m e n t  has  p r o v id e d  an a c c e s s  t o  
f a c i l i t i e s  a t  Danang and Cam Ranh Bay t o  b a l a n c e  t h e  US b a s e s  a t  S ub ic  
and C la rk  f i e l d  and a l s o  h e l p e d  e n c i r c l e m e n t  o f  China from i t s  s o u t h e r n  
b o r d e r s .  However,  one s i g n i f i c a n t  change  on t h e  r e c e n t  S o v i e t  
d i p l o m a t i c  s c e n e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  Kampuchean i s s u e  has  emerged  w i t h  
S o v i e t  Genera l  S e c r e t a r y  M ikha i l  G o r b a c h e v ' s  keen  i n t e r e s t  in  
n o r m a l i s i n g  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  Ch ina .  As China made t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f
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Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea an obstacle to their normalisation, so 
new pressures were brought to bear on Hanoi.1 2 It is, however, unlikely 
that normalisation will take place in the near future.
As the USSR reportedly has to provide Vietnam about three 
million dollars in aid a day, the US sees the conflict as putting 
aunother burden on the Soviets, in addition to Cuba, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere, all of which, the US hopes, will drain Soviet resources and 
reduce its global capabilities.
Ultimaltely, any solution needs ASEAN's active participation as 
it is directly affected by the conflict. However, despite the fact 
that ASEAN has succeeded in mobilising international support in most 
international fora, especially in the UN General Assembly, where the 
votes for ASEAN-sponsored resolutions supporting the CGDK and calling 
for Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea have increased almost every 
year, there is little prospect for a compromise settlement. Because 
there is a constant need to maintain the group's solidarity and because 
it has won political victories in international fora, ASEAN seems to
3believe that it needs to maintain its present course. Furthermore, 
given the differences among its members, ASEAN is not, and is unlikely 
to be, a military alliance. This means that it cannot mobilise 
sufficient power to achieve its objectives where Kampuchea is concerned
1 Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986: Beginning to tire", Asian 
Survey, -January 1987, p.122,
2 In 1980, it was 97 for, 23 against; in 1981, 100-25; in 1982, 
105-23; in 1984, 100-22; and in 1985; 114-21. The SRV, Cuba, the USSR, 
and, with the exception of Rumania, Moscow's Eastern European Warsaw 
Pact allies recognised the Heng Samrin regime.
Paribatra, Between Watana Nakorn and the UNGA.>.., (op.cit.)
P. 12.
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Thus, despite expressed desires to lessen the degree of external 
powers' involvement. ASEAN members collectively and individually are 
committed to seeking and maintaining extra-regional affiliations, 
especially with the US and the PRC.
Looking towards the future, it seems that there will be no 
weakening of Vietnamese control over Phnom Penh. Vietnam has maintained 
close control over Kampuchea through Heng Samrin, and has little 
interest in either military withdrawal or a political settlement.ASEAN, 
however, has hope for settlement when the costs of Vietnam's occupation 
of Kampuchea reach a sufficient level and if the forces of Sihanouk and 
Son Sann demonstrate a capacity to grow in strength and effectiveness. 
The ASEAN members, Thailand in particular, perceive that Vietnam has 
military problems and is facing economic stagnation, and it also lacks 
international assistance. Moreover, in Kampuchea, Vietnam has faced 
challenges by the resistance groups of the CGDK. In time, ASEAN hopes, 
Vietnam will seek a settlement. However, from the Vietnamese view, it 
is true that the ASEAN states have been successful in supporting the 
CGDK but unless the Khmer Rouge regime changed its leadership and 
broadened its representation, the likelihood of Vietnam’s attempt for 
a compromise settlement would be slim. On this matter, it is clear 
that the role of Sihanouk and Son Sann is critical.
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CONCLUSION
Geographical ly, it, is clear that, Thailand is the most vulnerable 
ASEAN member to the Kampuchean conflict. However* as Thailand does not 
want to be dragged into the conflict, it has attempted to be neutral. 
Prior to the Kampuchean conflict in 1979, General Kriangsak Chomanand, 
Thailand's Prime Minister from 1977-1980 expressed his major goal in 
conducting his foreign policies as to improve relations with 
neighbouring Indochinese states (since the preceding government of 
Thanin Kraivichian was extremely anti-communist).
However, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea reversed 
Kriangsak's policy of entente. Since then, Thailand had no choice but 
to try to force Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea. In coping with 
the Kampuchean problem Bt an early stage, Kriangsak pursued his 
"omni-directional" policy in attempting to strengthen Thailand's 
position. As a result, he obtained a reassurance of continued US 
support and military supplies. He was also the first Thai premier to 
visit Moscow, signalling his desire to be consulted over regional 
affairs. Moreover, with regard to the PRC, Kriangsak's diplomacy 
brought about the so-called Thai-Chinese alignment.
As the successor of General Kriangsak, General Prem continued 
Thai policy to Kampuchea as one based on the basic assumption that a 
Vietnamese-controlled Indochina posed a threat to Thailand's security. 
Thailand's orientations towards the Kampuchean problem under Prem, 
however, obviously shifted from a policy of entente in relations to the 
communist Indochina states to a strongly anti-Vietnamese policy. His 
hardline attitudes towards the Kampuchean issue was reflected in his 
attempts to persuade Chinese leaders to consider the formation of the 
Kampuchean resistance coalition.
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Relations between Thailand and China have obviously grown 
closer as their interests, to a certain extent, coincide. Under Prem, 
the Thais seek to coordinate policy with China on the assumption that 
Chinese support is essential to provide aid for resistance against 
Vietnamese within Kampuchea. Thailand's attempts to be neutral in the 
issue have thus lost all meaning during the Prem government.
At an early stage, responses from ASEAN to the Kampuchean 
conflict were similar to its stated objectives of preserving peace and 
upholding the self-determination of the Kampuchean people. ASEAN's 
common political position on Kampuchea is thus understandable; the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese occupation forces and the dismantling of its 
puppet regime in Phnom Penh, followed by the restoration of a truly 
indigenous and representative government based on self-determination. 
Its common stand on the Kampuchean problem is one of the reasons for 
its resilience, with fellow-members unity behind its front-line state, 
Thailand. This common political position, however, is not without 
difficulties.
The most obvious problem for the ASEAN governments concerning 
the policy towards Kampuchea is the threat posed to ASEAN cohesion by 
their intra-associat ion differences of opinions over the best course to 
take in relation to Indochina. There are two divergent conceptions of 
security interests among ASEAN members. On the one hand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia have enduring perceptions of a long-term Chinese threat. On 
the other hand, Thailand and Singapore regard the resurgence of 
Vietnamese communism as posing the most serious threat to the region, 
thus seeing the PRC as a significant source of countervailing power.
Consequently, ASEAN-PRC relations regarding the Kampuchean 
problem are characterized by a curious ambivalence. On the one hand, 
because China has strongly backed Thailand against Vietnamese pressure, 
ASEAN engaged in tacit diplomatic coordination with Beijing on
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Indochinese policy. On the other hand, China is distrusted because of 
its possible regional ambitions, while the overseas Chinese residents 
in ASEAN are seen as a source of internal instability in some ASEAN 
states.
Fortunately, however, ASEAN speaks with one voice on the 
Kampuchean issue. Observers have noted that the organization's decision­
making format is always based on consensus -on the "lowest common 
denominator". What this means in practice is that no decision is ever 
taken if any one of its member states expresses reservation over any 
subject.
Nevertheless, a close relation between Thailand and China can 
well be perceived. Thai analysts themselves are not sanguine about the 
Association's ability to assist militarily in the event of a serious 
Vietnamese challenge. As far as military action is concerned, Thailand 
sees China as a much more credible tacit ally and a more potent 
deterrent to Hanoi.
Regarding prospects for settlement, the level of conflict seems 
tolerable to all parties involed. For the PRC, the conflict has been an 
effective means of maintaining pressure on Vietnam. Since the Kampuchean 
crisis in 1979, China has sought a common front in Southeast Asia 
against Vietnam an the Kampuchean issue. The policy has been generally 
successful to a certain extent. However, the problem is that there are 
some disagreements between China and the ASEAN members on their 
attitudes towards a negotiated settlement. A major disagreement is that 
concerning the role of the Khmer Rouge if and when the SRV withdraws 
from Kampuchea. The PRC contends that the Khmer Rouge must be given a 
role after the withdrawal while ASEAN states take a softer position, 
recognising that allowing Heng Samrin to remain would prevent the Khmer 
Rouge from returning to power.
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For t h e  US, t h e  V ie tna m ese  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  Kampuchea i s  a s o u r c e  
o f  e m ba r ra s sm e n t  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t s  and c o n s t i t u t e s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  m i l i t a r y  
and f i n a n c i a l  b u r d e n .  T h i s  p r o b a b l y  p r o v i d e s  a r a t i o n a l e  t o  American 
o p i n i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  US m i l i t a r y  b u i l d u p .  
I t  t h u s  seems t h a t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  t h e  US t o  i n i t i a t e  any 
s e t t l e m e n t  t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  c o n f l i c t .
For  t h e  USSR, s u p p o r t  f o r  Vie tnam in  Kampuchea h a s  p r o v i d e d  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  e x a c t  g r e a t e r  s t r a t e g i c  a d v a n ta g e s  from t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
w i t h  t h e  SRV w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  a second f r o n t  i n  t h e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  
C h i n a .
C l e a r l y ,  T h a i l a n d  has  a t t e m p t e d  t o  o r g a n i s e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p r e s s u r e  a g a i n s t  Vie tnam t o  f o r c e  a s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  Kampuchean 
p rob lem . Thai p o l i c y  h a s  two f e a t u r e s  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  F i r s t ,  t h e  
p r e s e n t  Prem gove rnm en t  h a s  promoted  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o  h o l d  an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a g re e m e n t  on Kampuchea t h a t  would f o c u s  w o r ld  o p i n i o n  
upon V i e tn a m ' s  o c c u p a t i o n  o f  Kampuchea and would a l s o  d e v i s e  a s o l u t i o n  
t o  t h e  d i s p u t e  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  a l l  c o n c e r n e d .  Second,  in  o r d e r  t o  f o r c e  
Vietnam t o  w i t h d ra w  from Kampuchea, T h a i l a n d  has  s o u g h t  a u n i t e d  
r e s i s t a n c e  f r o n t  i n  Kampuchea t h a t  would combine t h e  s t r e n g t h s o f  t h e  
Khmer Rouge and t h e  Non-communist  g r o u p s .  In t h i s  s e n s e ,  f rom t h e  Thai  
v i e w p o i n t ,  C h i n e s e  s u p p o r t  i s  t h u s  e s s e n t i a l  b o t h  t o  g u a r a n t e e  t h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  any s o l u t i o n  and t o  p r o v i d e  m a t e r i a l  a i d  f o r  s u c c e s s f u l  
r e s i s t a n c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  V i e t n a m ' s  o c c u p a t i o n  in  Kampuchea.
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